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 “How often were the voters discerning, how often dumb? How frequently were they 
fooled, and how frequently did they go unerringly to the better man? How often did 
they elect the apparently superior candidate, only to find that the presidency was the 
one job in the nation that he could not handle? How often did they choose the man 
who was more capable of solving the existing problems, only to have a radical change 
in the course of history render his particular qualities useless and make the defeated 
one the ideal executive to handle the new situations?” 
– Irving Stone, “They Also Ran” (1943). 
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Abstract 
Why do parties re-nominate losing candidates? This project develops a comparative 
theory for losers of elections, who are not a monolithic group of low-quality non-
winners. We advance that political parties take note of two moments, one before the 
election and one after the race. These moments consider the electoral experience and 
the electoral performance of the candidate, respectively. Thus, we contend that parties 
treat experienced candidates differently from amateurs, and over-performers differently 
than under-performers when considering their futures in the electoral arena, despite all 
being equally losing candidates. 
For our empirical chapters, we explore the Chilean legislative elections, where an 
“insurance policy” mechanism for good losers developed mainly because of the 
electoral system in place since the return of democracy in 1989. This arrangement 
consisted of valuable appointments for candidates who were unable to win a legislative 
seat. Our exploration of the main question is twofold: first, we look at the seven 
legislative elections from 1989 to 2013, assessing the determinants of re-nomination, 
along with other outcomes that losing candidates followed. Second, we analyze the use 
of presidential appointments – to cabinet, embassies, or top regional executive positions 
– before and after the 2015 electoral reform, comparing the 2017 elections to the period 
including the seven races under the binominal electoral system. 
For the first empirical section, chapter 3, our main finding tells us that losing candidates 
who over-perform with respect to previous candidates for the same coalition in the same 
district are re-nominated in greater numbers than all other also-rans. Meanwhile, our 
 vii 
second empirical section shows a continuous use of presidential appointments across 
both periods, pre and post-reform. 
Expanding the understanding of elections to include losing candidates – especially after 
realizing that some of these unsuccessful politicians come back to win elections – is a 
pending task for political scientists. We hope this is the start of a more nuanced 
discussion about the topic, with a framework that can be expanded to other countries. 
Similarly, these results can be complemented by qualitative studies with interviews to 
also-rans who are now winners, or to perennial losers, to gauge their strategies after 
being confronted with electoral defeat. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Winners of elections are only one part of the puzzle surrounding popular 
elections. After races are finished, many party and candidate dynamics occur around 
losing candidates, and their own chances to stay in politics and develop a career. This 
project deals with the role of also-rans in politics from two fronts. First, it explores the 
chances of re-nomination for losing candidates in legislative elections over time. Then, 
it tests the use of presidential appointments as a reward mechanism for good losers. 
For this initial exploration of the often-overlooked role of losing candidates in 
politics, we focus on the case of Chile. The reasons to choose this country are twofold: 
on the one hand, the Chilean political landscape provides a stable party system with two 
strong coalitions wrestling for legislative control for the first seven elections between 
1989 and 2013. Then, many scholars have shown that the binomial electoral system for 
the legislative provided the right incentives for the development of an “insurance 
policy” arrangement that would provide presidential appointments to good losers of 
legislative races. 
So, this case allows us to first assess the determinants of re-nomination for losing 
candidates across twenty-five years, and later the use of this pool of also-rans by future 
presidential administrations to name attractive candidates to positions of executive trust. 
In addition, the electoral reform passed in 2015 and put into effect for the 2017 
legislative elections provides an institutional break, where we can compare how things 
fare before and after this change for the mechanism of appointments. 
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The summary of the three chapters is structured as follows: Chapter 1 focuses 
on developing a comparative theory for losing candidates that takes into consideration 
the role of parties in their fate. Thus, it separates also-rans by two dimensions – one 
known before the election and another revealed after races are finished – that follow 
their electoral experience and their electoral performance, respectively. This means that 
parties will be nominating amateur and veteran candidates to different seats with distinct 
expectations for each of them, and after elections are finished, parties will have a tally 
of their under-performing and over-performing losing politicians.  
Touching on literature dealing with repeat challengers, candidate quality, the 
incumbency advantage, and the nomination of candidates, we present our claims that 
relate to these two dimensions and how they serve as signals to parties of the standing 
of their losing politicians. Therefore, we are also helping to explain why parties do not 
start over with all-new challengers across districts after elections are finished. We 
contend that the experience is a valuable ex-ante consideration, while performance 
becomes a significant ex-post marker which makes candidates stand out in the pool of 
losing candidates that parties have at their disposal at the end of a race.  
In Chapter 2 we justify the selection of Chile as our case study in more detail, 
and later set our expectations with this project. In general, we expect both dimensions 
to significantly affect the way parties see their candidates, which in turn will affect their 
future chances of staying in electoral politics or possibly being appointed to a position 
of presidential trust. Thus, and despite an electoral setback, experienced candidates will 
be thought of as having a greater know-how than amateur politicians, given a greater 
leeway when thinking about future chances. Meanwhile, electoral over-performers will 
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send a more positive signal to a party that they are attractive candidates and they deserve 
a future nod. 
Later, Chapter 3 puts the first claim to the test, and we establish the cut points 
for our two categories of losing candidates. First, we think of amateurs as candidates 
without previous experience in legislative elections, while veterans are those politicians 
with two or more legislative races under their belts. For the former category, we create 
a secondary distinction in the form of local winners, who are amateurs in legislative 
elections but with winning experience at the municipal level. We expect significant 
differences between these two categories as well, as voters will see a previous local 
winner differently than a completely new amateur candidate in the legislative arena. 
Furthermore, for the electoral performance dimension, we establish the cut point 
as the vote share of the first losing candidate for the same coalition in the previous 
legislative election. Thus, under-performing candidates are those with a lower vote 
share than the candidate closest to a seat – but unable to get one – in the previous election 
for the same coalition. This assumes that parties will take as an initial measure to 
evaluate the future of their unsuccessful candidates the comparison between their 
performance to the results of candidates selected in the past for the same district. 
Results of the statistical analyses performed to our original database show that 
local winners are more likely to be re-nominated than amateur candidates with no 
experience, and electoral over-performers have a greater chance of coming back for the 
same seat in the next election. Additionally, our models show the determinants for other 
outcomes, like seeking a higher election in the future, changing districts within the same 
chamber, or retiring from electoral politics. We find that veteran candidates are more 
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likely to seek a higher election – thus moving from the Lower Chamber to the Senate, 
or from the Senate to the presidency. 
In addition, compared to amateurs, electoral over-performers and local winners 
are less likely to retire from electoral politics. Moreover, candidates who ran in districts 
where the capital city is located are more likely to switch districts within the same 
chamber. This effect is also significant with over-performers from capital city districts, 
suggesting that parties pay special attention to candidates in more notorious districts, 
and over-performers are moved to better districts for future elections. 
These results cover the first seven legislative elections celebrated after the return 
of democracy in Chile, between 1989 and 2013. The legislative election of 2021 will be 
the first one to show us the fate of many 2017 losing candidates, so future research 
includes the exploration of many of the losing candidates featured in this analysis. An 
important additional consideration relates to the current political turmoil in the region, 
and the possibility of former also-rans looking to reap benefits from an uncertain 
scenario is a very interesting wrinkle to explore. 
Lastly, Chapter 4 explores the mechanism of presidential appointments as a 
system to reward good losers of legislative elections. The literature on the subject claims 
that the main cause of this “insurance policy” arrangement stemmed from the presence 
of the binomial electoral system, that implemented a district of magnitude of two across 
all bailiwicks, fostering both intra and inter-coalition competition. This made parties in 
the two most powerful coalitions present two strong pairs of candidates fighting in key 
districts for only two seats, which made two resourceful challengers lose out on a 
legislative seat. 
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As a consolation prize for incurring in these costs, and for potentially staining 
their records with an electoral defeat, the coalition that ended up winning the concurrent 
presidential election used appointments as a reward for top losers. In order to identify 
those good losers, we use two strategies. First, we replicate and extend the work done 
by Carey and Siavelis (2003) in their theorizing of electoral “bridesmaids” for the three 
legislative elections between 1989 and 1997. Their framework classifies those 
candidates as the losers in the pairings of the triumphant coalition in the presidential 
election.  
Our extension develops two new models, one including the seven elections 
between 1989 and 2013, and one with the 2017 race, after the electoral system change. 
The first model shows that Senate candidates have a greater chance of being appointed 
than Lower Chamber also-rans. This result is consistent with the original authors’ 
findings. In turn, the between-coalition ratio – measuring the vote difference between 
the two most powerful Chilean coalitions by district – loses its significance, while the 
within-coalition ratio – marked by the vote difference between candidates of the same 
coalition – gains significance with more observations collected. 
In turn, the coefficients for the 2017 model – with a new operationalization for 
a bridesmaid politician – show the expected direction but lack statistical significance 
for all three variables of interest. This is why we use our original database to assess the 
determinants of a presidential appointment after an electoral defeat, as the second part 
of our exploration. We used similar measures for the electoral experience of an also-
ran, and we created an original measure for electoral performance. This indicator 
identifies the “first losers” for the coalition that made the appointments in the following 
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presidential administration. A first loser is a candidate who ended up the closest to a 
seat in a district but was not able to win it. A rare events logistic regression finds that 
first losers have a greater likelihood of being appointed than other types of losing 
candidates. We also find significant effects for Senate candidates, but no significant 
effects for the experience of an also-ran. 
This project is a novel attempt at exploring the fate of legislative losing 
candidates across time. We now have evidence to claim that it matters how a candidate 
loses, and therefore not all losers should be placed in the same box as election residuals, 
nor we should expect losing candidates to behave like a monolithic group. Now, it 
becomes imperative to continue the work to expand the literature on the subject, but we 
hope this is the start of a comparative study of unsuccessful candidates.  
The role of losers has been overshadowed by the short-term dynamics of 
winners. However, when knowing that politicians like Hillary Clinton, Newt Gingrich, 
Mitt Romney, and John Kerry all continue to be relevant in American politics despite 
experiencing different degrees of electoral defeat, it becomes clear that some also-rans 
have the potential to break away from that label and become electorally viable 
politicians with prosperous careers. 
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Chapter 1: A Theory of Losing Candidates 
Conceptualizing Losers of Elections 
Why do parties re-nominate electoral losers? Losing an election deals a 
significant blow to a politician’s hopes of developing a political career. Showing up to 
a popular race and not winning the seat in dispute can affect the future strategies of a 
candidate to a great degree. However, if we think about politicians who are relevant in 
the political arena, many of them suffered electoral defeat but were re-nominated by 
their parties despite this. One of the most notorious cases of a still-relevant losing 
candidate is Hillary Clinton, unsuccessful in the 2008 democratic presidential primaries 
and runner-up in the 2016 presidential election, who still holds strong political influence 
in American politics. 
Similarly, before Newt Gingrich shaped the landscape of the American Congress 
as a perennial member of the House at the end of the 20th century, he was defeated at 
the ballot box. As a Republican newcomer, he ran for Georgia’s 6th congressional 
district against Democrat John J. Flynt, in 1974 and 1976, losing both times. However, 
Gingrich obtained over 48% of the vote in a district historically dominated by the 
Democratic Party. When Flynt retired from politics in 1978, Gingrich won the seat with 
over 54% of the votes, being reelected six more times. After the 1990 census, Gingrich 
kept control of a redrawn 6th district for six more years until his departure from the 
House in 1999 due to internal conflicts in the Republican Party. 
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Also-rans1 have an important role in politics as challengers who support the 
system that is governed by winners, and their consent to abide by these rules despite 
losing is key to maintain democratic systems (Anderson et al., 2005). However, we still 
lack a strong grasp on the strategies that both political parties and losing candidates 
develop once they are aware of their electoral defeat. Theories like the incumbency 
advantage (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Cox and Katz, 1996; Cox and Morgenstern, 
1993; Trounstine, 2011) and the closeness of elections (Cox and Munger, 1989; Geys, 
2006) have the goal of assessing the margins for candidates to win an election, while 
losers appear as afterthoughts who are relevant only when they give the favorites a hard 
time to secure the seat.  
At the same time, political parties are very active in the post-election period 
when they decide the fate of their unsuccessful hopefuls, but a systematic analysis of 
these dynamics is lacking. Parties face a difficult predicament when deciding which 
candidates to re-nominate for the same seat in the next election, which candidates to 
move to other districts, and those also-rans who will not make the cut for future elections 
or are thought for other roles within government. Therefore, just as not all winners are 
the same, also-rans are not equal. As a contrast to the Gingrich example, we have 2016 
presidential hopeful Jill Stein, who ran in multiple elections with no success but has 
remained a visible face for the Green Party.2 Meanwhile, Joe Crowley decided to step 
down from electoral politics after losing to newcomer Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. 
                                                 
1 For clarity purposes, when we talk about terms like also-rans, losing candidates, unsuccessful politicians 
and hopefuls throughout this dissertation, we are referring to the same thing: a candidate who lost an 
election and was unable to win a seat. 
2 For more information, see https://ballotpedia.org/Jill_Stein 
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As the examples reviewed show, parties face uncertainty when making these 
decisions, having to anticipate the potential success of their candidates to the best of 
their abilities. As most actors in politics are risk-averse, most nomination strategies from 
parties follow candidates who are successful, whether inside their parties or in general 
elections (André et al., 2017; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Norris, 1997). Hence, when the 
scenario is unfavorable and suffers from low levels of information, instead of doing a 
hard reset and trying entirely new candidates, the best strategy for parties may be to 
follow potential signals of success from some of their politicians who just lost an 
election. 
This chapter proposes a theory for losing candidates that builds from two 
moments that political parties observe, taking as signals of the relative strength of their 
candidates compared to others. One of those moments is known before the election and 
is related to the electoral experience of the candidate at the time of running, while the 
other moment is revealed after the unsuccessful election and centers on the degree of 
electoral performance of the hopeful. A combination of these two features generates 
different types of losing candidates, that have differing expectations and are seen 
differently by their parties. 
Before candidates are selected, parties have a sense of the experience of their 
best exponents. In the selection process, most candidates are placed in seats all actors 
believe they can win.3 But when that does not happen, parties pay attention to the 
performance of the also-ran to make any future decisions. In some cases, giving a losing 
                                                 
3 As we will touch upon later in this chapter, we also recognize that some candidates run for reasons other 
than winning. 
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candidate a second chance at the seat they could not secure the first time is the best 
strategy for a risk-averse political party. This is due to the experience or notoriety of the 
also-ran, or because the candidate performed better than anticipated despite losing, and 
one more try can get him over the required threshold to win a seat. Also, when faced 
with an amateur running instead, parties do have more information about this losing 
candidate than about a candidate with no experience in the same type of elections.  
So, these ex-ante and ex-post signals create two different dimensions that help 
with information deficits, making parties more or less likely to re-nominate a losing 
candidate for an upcoming election. First, we expect that the electoral experience of a 
politician in the legislative arena will make significant differences in how a party sees 
them, compared to candidates lacking such experience. Keeping all else constant, a 
candidate with at least one previous appearance in the same election will have an 
advantage over an amateur candidate, because they will be perceived as having a greater 
know-how and to be better prepared to face the challenges of an election of this 
magnitude.  
There is ample literature dealing with the concept of candidate quality (Carson 
et al., 2007; Jacobson, 1990; Krasno and Green, 1988; Mondak, 1995), showing among 
other things that previous experience can give candidates an edge in electoral politics. 
So, by itself, a candidate with a previous appearance in the same election will send a 
signal that she is better prepared than an amateur, and we expect that after an election 
where both of those candidates lost, the chances of re-nomination are greater for the 
more experienced also-ran.  
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Then, losing candidates who do well electorally and barely missed the cut have 
another bargaining chip to negotiate their fates as politicians, especially when compared 
to also-rans from the same party who did poorly, or well below expectations. Likewise, 
there is evidence regarding the placement of losing candidates, and “first losers” or 
runners-up are seen differently than an also-ran further down on the list of losers 
(Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Shepsle, 2003). These “rank heuristics” can serve as a first 
signal to voters and parties to consider one losing candidate more seriously than another, 
helping them be placed in a more friendly scenario in a future election. 
To test this theory, we use data from legislative elections in Chile. This country 
has a multiparty system with two strong coalitions that resemble many features of the 
American two-party system. However, much more dynamism is observed at the party 
level and after third-coalitions form to compete with the two bigger historical groups in 
a given election. In both the intra-coalition and inter-coalition dynamics, parties are in 
relative positions vis-à-vis other parties, so an over-performer from one coalition can be 
in better standing than an over-performer from another, and a candidate switching from 
one party to another can improve her chances to win much more than if the change were 
to be to a third party or to an independent candidacy. 
Moreover, Chile offers stability to measure the same variables over time, 
keeping most of the control variables constant over time for the legislative elections 
between 1989 and 2013, right before the institutional changes to the electoral system 
done in 2015. This stability diminishes the role of time-constrained variables and allows 
us to more cleanly trace the variation in the dependent variable to the effect of the 
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independent variables added in the models. Then, the 2017 legislative election under 
the new electoral system is a good instance to perform comparisons between systems. 
This is especially salient considering another feature that the former Chilean 
electoral system for legislative elections was said to create. Given that districts were all 
of magnitude two, with a D’Hondt arrangement of assigning seats after counting votes 
by coalition instead that by candidate, there was the possibility of two candidates of the 
same coalition getting both seats if they doubled the vote share of all other coalitions in 
the district. This generated intense competition across districts, and the two strongest 
coalitions recruited top candidates for battleground bailiwicks.  
However, the possibility that many of these resourceful candidates would lose 
their bids was significant, so a “consolation prize” structure developed, where the ruling 
coalition – decided after the presidential election, most of the time concurrent with the 
legislative race – would use presidential appointments as a way to reward good losers 
with strong resumes who took considerable risks after running for a seat that was tough 
to obtain (Carey and Siavelis, 2003; Navia, 2005). 
This system also shows the marked importance that also-rans have for Chilean 
politics. Losing candidates are not considered a residual of elections, and parties 
recognize the value of many of them, and the hefty costs that they had to pay to appear 
in some elections instead of choosing other positions. Thus, when a coalition wins the 
executive power, their most successful also-rans are called back to positions of 
presidential trust, like a cabinet position to serve within the country, or an ambassador 
position to serve abroad.  
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Consequently, the first empirical chapter of this project is an analysis of the 
1989-2013 election period, with the main goal of assessing the determinants of re-
nomination for also-rans. This exploration is complemented by separate statistical 
analyses of three more outcomes occurring: a losing candidate seeking a higher seat in 
the next election, an also-ran changing districts within the same chamber, and an 
unsuccessful hopeful retiring from electoral politics. We expect that both experienced 
and high-performing losers will seek better opportunities within the legislative branch, 
while those candidates lacking experience or those suffering a poor showing will have 
a higher chance of retiring from electoral politics. 
Meanwhile, chapter 4 in this project consists of an exploration of the “insurance 
policy” system for good losers of legislative elections. We compare the system before 
and after the electoral reform of 2015, tackling the claim that it was the incentives within 
the old system that helped create this arrangement. However, we expect that regardless 
of the system in place, candidates of discernible quality will decide to run in competitive 
elections because these races provide enough visibility to their parties and coalitions, 
who can later reward the best also-rans with future appointments. 
The main findings of this project show that candidates who perform better than 
the first loser in the previous election for the same district are re-nominated in greater 
numbers than the rest of losing candidates. In turn, having held a seat in a lower election 
increases the chances of re-nomination for candidates, compared to amateurs with no 
experience. Additionally, the system of rewards from the executive for good legislative 
losers continues to be used under a new electoral system for legislative elections. These 
findings show that losers of elections are not to be considered an afterthought, and that 
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parties and administrations do keep an eye on promising candidates, despite electoral 
setbacks. 
We hope that these two ways of looking at the relevance of losing candidates in 
a political system opens the door for more analyses of the role of also-rans in politics, 
not only as spoilers or as leftovers of elections. A comparative look at also-rans can 
unearth party dynamics that have remained understudied for too long, enlightening us 
on how actors see electoral defeat. For some, losing an election can be a first step to a 
shift in campaign efforts that lead to eventual victory. And for others, strong losers can 
still be valuable assets for a future presidential administration.  
It Matters How You Lose 
Regardless of the challenges facing also-rans, losing an election is not 
necessarily a death sentence for politicians. This is due to losers not being equal in their 
expectations when considering future elections, and parties not evaluating losers in the 
same way. In addition to Gingrich, we have witnessed a myriad of other cases of former 
losers being able to develop a political career despite a significant electoral setback. Mitt 
Romney is a current Senator for the state of Utah despite losing a Senate seat in 1994 
and a presidential bid in 2012. Ralph Nader could not find success in presidential 
elections but has been instrumental for policy discussions and policy change. And more 
recently, Robert Francis “Beto” O’Rourke gained national notoriety after losing the 
Texas 2018 senatorial election. But just as we see potential for success, there are 
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candidates who turn into perennial candidates and never achieve any electoral 
accomplishments.4 
The current literature dealing with electoral politics mentions also-rans mostly 
in the context of them being an obstacle to the eventual winners (Herron and Lewis, 
2007; Horng-En Wang and Chen, 2019; Jenkins and Morris, 2006), and centering on 
issues like the competitiveness of elections, the incumbency advantage and voter 
turnout. But a systematic analysis of the fate of also-rans that goes further than a surface-
level examination is lacking. Despite being introduced and advanced by a set of authors 
some decades ago (Riker, 1986), it seems that the last couple of decades have provided 
a larger window for the study of also-rans (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Anderson et al., 
2005; Shepsle, 2003). 
For example, exploring a promising avenue of research regarding the paths of 
legislative politicians that goes beyond winning the next election, Coates and Munger 
(1994) include more outcomes for these types of candidates that include defeat, 
retirement and pursuit of other office. Results of their study show that vote share is a 
strong ex-ante determinant of losing an election in the future and the incumbency 
advantage is greater for freshman politicians. These results show that the interpretation 
of theories that involve the security and prospects of politicians is incomplete when only 
considering candidate success as winning, and candidate failure as losing. 
Moreover, after elections draw winners and losers, voters, the media, and 
scholars tend to discount those who could not secure a seat, in favor of studying and 
                                                 
4 For an extreme case of a perennial loser of elections, see the story of Canadian John Turmel: 
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ontario-election-2018/meet-john-turmel-canada-s-most-defeated-
election-candidate-1.3877244 
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covering elected officials. This “survivorship bias” makes actors focus 
disproportionately on winners of elections, overlooking the rest of the candidates. By 
omitting the role of also-rans, studies and reports leave a significant part of the puzzle 
out of the analysis, overestimating the relevance of those who win elections, and treating 
losers as a monolithic group with no possibility of improvement and no prospects for 
the future.  
This approach, however, is far from accurate. Looking at the number of 
challengers in a race can help us understand why some incumbents retire while others 
changed districts after losing. Similarly, looking at the vote share of also-rans can tell 
us why some of those losing candidates came back for the next election while others did 
not. Then, some losing candidates today will be election winners, policymakers, or 
appointed authorities tomorrow. Depending on factors like their age, party, ambition or 
even the right opportunity, many former losing candidates will end up in a position of 
power in politics. 
Thus, it becomes important to know how they were able to get there knowing 
the dynamics of the evolution of candidates who once were also-rans is an important 
challenge for political science. In this project, we advance that both the electoral 
experience and performance of a candidate are key signals for parties to re-nominate 
some of them for the same seat in the next election. However, there are different 
combinations of these two dimensions that will yield different outcomes for losing 
candidates. Winning an election is only a part of the equation for the success or failure 
of a political career, and we need to uncover more of the mechanisms that place 
candidates in the ballot on Election Day. 
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For example, also-rans who surpassed the expected vote shares for the party the 
first time running can be asked to come back and run for a second time. Also, when 
hopefuls are nominated to run against a powerful incumbent, that race can be considered 
a trial run for the candidate, so losing may be an expected outcome in the present, but 
one that could open partisan doors for the candidate in the future. After analyzing the 
potentially different fates of different also-rans over time, we develop a typology of 
losing candidates that follows partisan considerations before and after elections occur. 
This typology helps explain why some of these unsuccessful challengers return to 
politics for more elections, while others do not run again.  
Additionally, this dissertation tackles the notion that quality candidates must be 
electorally successful, as we present evidence that shows that even quality hopefuls have 
lost elections over time. In fact, losing an election can give some candidates an edge 
over inexperienced candidates in a future election, so some of these also-rans have 
ample reasons to come back and fight for a seat one more time. Parties can influence 
the future of politicians too, as some systems with strong parties may develop “insurance 
mechanisms” for candidates who are assured defeat, enticing them with favorable 
appointments if they run and lose in tough districts. Similarly, other also-rans who lost 
the support of their respective parties may come back as members of other parties, or 
even as independents. 
In our case, leaving also-rans outside of the understanding of the fate of winners 
and representative politics paints an incomplete picture of the entire phenomenon. This 
omission can affect our view of electoral politics, especially when former also-rans with 
a similar set of features than previous winners were able to secure a seat and losing an 
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election at one point in time actually helped the politicians in their political career. It is 
the work of both winners and losers that moves the system forward, and it is through 
the way actors adapt to their outcomes that we see how future elections shape. When 
we see the work done by both politicians and political parties to be part of this dynamic, 
we are better equipped to understand the role and contribution of electoral politics in 
established democracies. 
After elections are over, losers are dealt a significant blow in their potential for 
a successful political career. After all, their campaigns failed to meet expectations. But 
many of them do not go home after defeat and continue to think in popularly elected 
office as their next career move. Failed races show also-rans what went wrong with their 
campaigns, granting them an experience they could use in a future attempt at running 
for office. Despite this, current literature seems to focus solely on what happens in the 
spotlight, dismissing the other side of the same coin (Anderson et al., 2005: 2) and the 
work that also-rans and parties perform after elections are over.  
This more nuanced framework on the fate of losing candidates seems especially 
relevant in a single-member, plurality system, like the one used in higher offices in the 
United States, and in many other countries in the world. All candidates placed second 
or below in these elections are immediately losing candidates, despite having different 
degrees of experience, resources, and personal features. And this happens whether a 
candidate loses by thousands of votes or if he loses by one single vote. Failing to capture 
these differences between losing candidates is an important topic to explore for 
comparative electoral politics. 
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For all these reasons, a study of also-rans should consider the strengths of 
candidate before and after elections. Looking at the experience and performance of 
candidates creates distinct also-rans that have varying expectations and strengths. In the 
next section we propose a typology of losing candidates from the point of view of 
parties, after a race is over, and considering the electoral experience of candidates before 
they failed to win a seat, and their electoral performance after the election. 
Looking for Stand-Out Defeats 
 When looking at the pool of candidates in an election, experts gauge – with 
varying degrees of success – who will win a given seat. This is partly based on several 
candidate features, ranging from their previous experience in politics, their ability to 
raise funds, their political party, if they held that same office before, or if they are 
resourceful challengers, to name a few. One dimension that has garnered a significant 
amount of research is the quality of the candidates. Several measures have been 
developed to measure candidate quality, and we will review some of them below. 
The quality of a candidate is a combination of measurable traits that allow us to 
distinguish across candidates. Some of those traits give the candidates more “quality” 
over others and could make a difference when running for a seat (Carson et al., 2007). 
Generally, a measure of the quality of a candidate may include personal characteristics 
like their charisma and perceived strength as a candidate, the ability to develop a 
successful campaign (Squire, 1992), the capacity to be easily recognized by voters (Kam 
and Zechmeister, 2013), as well as their previous electoral experience and on-the-job 
competence (Mondak, 1995) and their ability to raise funds (Jacobson, 1990). 
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As an illustration of the importance of candidate quality, we can think of two 
candidates who share the same features, except for one of them being a previous 
representative and the other not having previous political experience. Keeping all else 
constant, the candidate that has political experience can be understood to be of higher 
quality than the other, because it is assumed this time in office provided the politician 
with a degree of know-how as to how to perform in the job. Compared to the higher 
quality candidate, the challenger does not possess that trait, and thus can be perceived 
as less optimal for the job by both parties and the electorate. 
The value of a measure like candidate quality is that these features send a signal 
to voters that one politician is of higher quality than another. For example, previously 
holding office can provide an electoral cushion for a candidate (Krasno and Green, 
1988), so challengers without previous experience might decide against running when 
another hopeful with a race under her belt seeks the incumbent’s seat. Thus, seeing an 
experienced hopeful in the ballot works as a heuristic for voters with regards to her 
quality, and to the potential to do a good job – or continue to do that job – once elected 
(Jacobson, 1989). After all, “we want representatives whom we can trust, and we want 
representatives who can get the job done” (Mondak, 1995: 1045). 
 Another sign of the quality of a candidate is their ability to raise money. 
Established politicians have less problems raising substantial sums of money for their 
campaigns, due to the notoriety and the networking advantages that holding office gives 
incumbents. Challengers have noticed this institutional advantage from sitting 
legislators (Miller, 2014: 83) that at times precludes prospective candidates from even 
running against resourceful incumbents. To tackle this disparity and level the 
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campaigning playing field, some have advanced the possibility of enhancing public 
funding for candidates and setting up caps for established politicians’ ability to fundraise 
(Miller, 2014), though some have found no major impact of policies like this (Brogan 
and Mendilow, 2012). 
Starting with an indicator of previously holding office, measures of candidate 
quality have refined over time, including dummy variables that now gauge celebrity 
status, the visibility of the challenger, among others that give a more nuanced look at 
professional and amateur candidates (Canon, 1990). As a complement of this type of 
quality, which can be defined as a set of strategic skills (Stone et al., 2006), a set of 
personal skills are also needed to achieve a certain degree of quality that could make a 
difference come Election Day. These two features seem to work in tandem, because an 
attractive personality without the skills to campaign adequately will find it hard to win 
elections, while good campaigners with no charisma will also struggle to win a seat. 
Personal traits can be the deciding factor in winning or losing an election, or in 
losing by a big margin or losing it by a few percentage points. One example of a 
candidate who exploited his attractive set of personal traits – which was complemented 
with strategic skills and political experience – is the aforementioned Beto O’Rourke. As 
a Texas senatorial candidate in the 2018 midterm elections, O’Rourke challenged 
incumbent Ted Cruz, campaigning on a platform of social media exposure and reaching 
out to college campuses and the more urban demographics in the state for their votes. 
Despite losing, O’Rourke mobilized a significant part of the younger, college-
educated population, and was able to obtain 48.3% of the votes, losing by a bit over 200 
thousand votes, from a total of over 8 million votes cast. Recently, O’Rourke dropped 
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out of the 2020 presidential race after chasing the Democratic Party nomination for 
several months. 
Another example of a losing candidate who may have benefitted from the 
platform they were in is Stacey Abrams, the gubernatorial also-ran for the state of 
Georgia in the 2018 midterm elections. Losing by a narrow margin, amidst some claims 
of voter suppression and fraud, Abrams was able to obtain almost 49% of the vote in 
that race, bettering the vote share of previous challengers.5 Before running for this seat, 
she served in the Georgia legislature, and this electoral defeat classifies her as an 
established politician. Currently, Abrams is said to be evaluating her political future, 
but after drawing record numbers of minority voters to the polls, while also winning a 
higher share of White voters than Barack Obama in the state,6 she could be in good 
position to be nominated by the Democratic Party in a future prominent election. 
In most cases, candidates who strive for office have their sights set on winning 
a seat, and expectations would focus on what to do after they win. However, constrains 
generated by the context of the election make some candidates have different 
motivations to run, that extend beyond winning. Thus, despite having a general 
expectation to win, some candidates know that winning will not be the outcome of the 
election, and yet they still decide to run. This can be explained by, for example, the 
motivation to be vote-seeking or policy-seeking politicians (Strøm, 1990), following 
their personal convictions, or the behavior of the party they represent. 
                                                 
5 For more on Abrams’ electoral history, see https://ballotpedia.org/Stacey_Abrams 
6 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/us/politics/stacey-abrams-georgia-democrats.html 
 23 
 This contrasts with a third model of behavior, office-seeking, which centers on 
candidates and parties trying to maximize their chances of obtaining office benefits with 
the limited options they have (Müller and Strøm, 1999). If candidates are more 
interested in the other two ways of public service, it is likely that they will conceptualize 
electoral defeat differently than contenders who are mainly office-seekers. On the one 
hand, vote-seekers may be satisfied with taking votes from other challengers and 
building an electoral base for a future election, or a future candidate. And on the other 
hand, policy-seeking politicians may be running to publicize their policy platform and 
to try to mobilize a dormant section of the electorate for a future run at office, or for 
future candidates with similar proposals. 
The distinction is made between candidates who have little to no chance of 
winning and those with potential to win the seat. Despite the expectation of doing the 
best possible to win, some elections feature non-serious potential candidates (Carsey 
and Berry, 2014), who are not expected to win, but can build from good showings to 
develop a potential political career. Vote shares can be a good indicator of future 
success, and “[a]lthough previous vote share is partly an evaluation of the party and 
partly an evaluation of the candidate on the ballot, it is the best overall indicator of the 
party’s prospects for success in the next election” (Carsey and Berry, 2014: 255). 
This section focused on the shortcuts that voters and parties can use to 
distinguish between candidates when trying to assess their potential to be successful, 
sometimes despite an electoral setback. In the end, given that politicians are not equal, 
it is also expected that losing candidates are not all the same, as there is a myriad of 
dimensions that determine candidates’ chances to further their political careers. In this 
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sense, adding an electoral defeat to the equation is another layer that politicians and 
parties need to evaluate before making their next move. When all these things work in 
combination, we will be able to answer why some losers come back to politics despite 
the strong deterrent of previous electoral defeat. 
The Electoral Performance and Electoral Experience of Also-Rans 
 This project advances a theory for losing candidates and political parties that 
involves a calculation from the latter of the electoral performance and the experience of 
the former to evaluate their chances of re-nomination or other forms of return to the 
electoral politics fray in a future election. If this calculation does not yield a positive 
result, parties may consider to not present the same candidate for another run, and the 
candidate is then forced to switch parties, districts, or retire from electoral politics 
altogether. 
Consider two candidates, A and B. They have similar backgrounds and similar 
expectations to win the seat they are chasing. Despite this, both lost their election, 
somewhat surprisingly. In the next election, candidate A secured a re-nomination while 
candidate B retired from politics. Despite both politicians having comparable 
experiences, one came back for another run while the other did not. We can think that 
two indicators may help us determine the likelihood of them coming back for another 
election. One of them is having a couple of elections under their belts, and the other is 
the electoral performance in the election, compared to previous candidates of the same 
party or coalition. If politician A ran in a couple of elections in the past and performed 
better than previous candidates of her same party, that can help explain her re-
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nomination. And also-ran B’s under-performing in the election can explain his 
retirement from politics to a great degree. 
Given that parties lack information and cannot evaluate losers’ performance in 
office, a proxy for this know-how is the experience of a candidate in the electoral arena. 
At the very least, having multiple races shows motivation and a drive to continue the 
pursuit for a seat despite adversity. It is advanced that the more experience an also-ran 
has, the more likelihood of a re-nomination, although this relationship is not expected 
to be linear. A second marker for the fate of losing candidates is their electoral 
performance, which matters more for inexperienced candidates. This is because 
inexperienced politicians can be thought of as lacking the know-how that seasoned 
candidates have, and a good performance can be the only factor that differentiates them. 
Absent clearer indicators,7 having participated in an election in the past serves 
as an early marker for the quality of a candidate. Candidates with a greater degree of 
quality are positioned in a different part of the re-nomination spectrum than hopefuls 
with a lower degree of quality. When coupling this with the performance of the 
candidates, we have two dimensions working simultaneously to explain the chances of 
re-nomination for also-rans. Thus, the one ex-ante and the one ex-post considerations 
serve as signals, and we will observe differences between candidates with a certain level 
of experience and performance then from candidates with other values in those 
categories. 
                                                 
7 For example, Astudillo (2014) finds that in the Spanish case, being a party chairman increases the 
chances for re-nomination at the local level. Thus, in some situations we can follow clear signals that 
provide candidates with a greater degree of quality than other challengers. 
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Generally, we can expect that amateurs who under-achieve electorally will be 
less likely to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. And ceteris paribus, 
veterans should be called back more. For this study, politicians with less than two 
elections of experience in the legislative race are classified as amateurs, and candidates 
with more are considered veterans. The literature distinguishes these candidates in terms 
of quality, with politicians who have previous experience in politics considered to be of 
higher quality than candidates who are new to the electoral fray. Then, the ex-post 
consideration gives parties more information about their candidates. If a candidate over-
achieves – understood here as obtaining a higher vote share than the first loser in the 
previous election for the same district – she is considered in higher regard than a 
candidate who under-achieved. 
Today, Newt Gingrich is a widely-known figure that shaped the American 
legislature in significant ways. However, he started his career losing two U.S. House 
elections in a row, in 1974 and 1976. A closer look shows that despite failing to win the 
Georgia 6th congressional district, he came close in both elections and eventually won 
the seat once the incumbent retired. In his first couple of races, then, he was the amateur 
who accrued electoral experience while over-performing electorally. Even though he 
did not have a Republican predecessor – given that John J. Flynt ran unopposed in the 
previous two elections – Gingrich obtained over 48% of the vote in his first try, in a 
very strong Democratic district. After securing the seat in 1978, Gingrich became the 
first Republican ever to win that district, keeping the seat until his resignation in 1999. 
Remaining inside the realm of American politics, we can revisit the example of 
Joe Crowley, former Democratic Congressman for New York’s 14th congressional 
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district. He served in that newly re-drawn district since winning the 2012 election, and 
before that he held the seat in the 7th congressional district since 1999.8 However, in the 
2018 Democratic primary election, he was defeated by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who 
obtained almost 57% of the primary vote – close to 17 thousand votes – compared to 
Crowley’s 43.3%.9 Crowley was the Chair of the House Democratic Caucus and held 
in high regard, but he was upset by Ocasio-Cortez. After this election, it has been 
reported that Crowley retired from electoral politics and is now a lobbyist.10 
Stepping outside of American politics, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is a former 
candidate to the presidency of Mexico for the National Democratic Front (FDN) 
coalition. He ran in the 1988 election, in what was confirmed later by former president 
Miguel de la Madrid to have been a fixed contest to keep the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) in power.11 After coming in second in this election, he remained in politics, 
running in the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections, ending up in third place both times 
(Roux, 2012). Despite Cárdenas’ ability to remain relevant in national politics with his 
veteran status, he could never secure the seat he pursued for most of his political career.  
A similar case with a better outcome is observed in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
former Brazilian president between 2003 and 2011. He helped form the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT) in 1980 and quickly raised through the ranks to become the 
candidate for the state government of São Paulo in 1982. He lost that race, but defeat 
seemed to have helped him, as less than four years later he ran for the Chamber of 
                                                 
8 More information about his electoral history available in https://ballotpedia.org/Joseph_Crowley 
9 https://ballotpedia.org/New_York%27s_14th_Congressional_District_election,_2018 
10 https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/19/crowley-shuster-lobbyists-1173771 
11 https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/world/ex-president-in-mexico-casts-new-light-on-rigged-1988-
election.html?_r=0 
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Deputies, winning with a nationwide majority. This platform allowed him to become 
the presidential candidate for the PT in the newly implemented direct presidential 
elections. 
However, it took Lula and the PT four tries to win the presidential seat (de 
Souza, 2011). After losing in the second round of the 1989 election and finishing second 
in 1994 and 1998, he won the presidential seat with 61.3% of the votes in the second 
round of the 2002 elections, defeating José Serra. Thus, Lula evolved from being a 
hopeful amateur to a prospect in little time, and losing elections helped him develop 
experience and gain quality until he was able to win in 2002. 
All in all, what the examples show is that the two dimensions advanced in this 
chapter provide a fair amount of nuance to consider their fate after electoral defeat. 
Hence, a veteran under-performer in a presidential election can still be successful in a 
lower election at a different time. To illustrate this point, we can use the example of 
John Kerry. He served as U.S. Senator from Massachusetts between 1985 and 2013, and 
in 2004 he was the Democratic Party nominee for the November presidential election. 
Despite losing this election and performing slightly worse than the previous two 
Democratic Party candidates, Kerry returned to his Senate seat and was able to win 
reelection in 2008 with almost two-thirds (65.9%) of the vote.  
This shows that politicians within the spectrum in each of the dimensions at one 
point in time and in one given election can still retain valuable qualities to be 
competitive at other points in time and different elections. This is certainly the case with 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who was elected as Head of Government of Mexico City in 1997 
despite his previous presidential woes. Thus, parties can perceive the same candidate 
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differently in two different times and depending on the election they contest. This 
implies that parties have dynamic expectations, updating or modifying their perceptions 
of candidates as time goes by due to the dimensions highlighted in this chapter.  
Another example of these dynamic expectations is reflected in the case of Mitt 
Romney. The 2012 presidential election was not the first time Romney experienced 
electoral defeat, as he lost the 1994 Senate election in Massachusetts against incumbent 
Ted Kennedy. At that time, Romney was an amateur who over-achieved electorally, 
obtaining 41% of the vote compared to 34% for the 1988 Democratic Party candidate, 
Joseph D. Malone,12 and the 38.3% obtained by Ray Shamie in 1982. Therefore, 1994 
Mitt Romney is not the same politician as 2012 Mitt Romney. The former was an 
amateur who acquired experience and ended up winning a high-level office – when he 
served as Governor of Massachusetts between 2003 and 2007 – while the latter is 
perceived as an established veteran politician, who after defeat in a presidential election 
and some work in the private sector, went on to win a U.S. Senate seat for the state of 
Utah in 2018. 
Lastly, some politicians can lose elections constantly and run for different seats 
over time, becoming perennial candidates. A rather extreme example of this is Vermont 
politician Cris Ericson. She ran as an independent candidate in two separate 2018 
contests, for governor of Vermont and the U.S. House at-large district for the state. She 
obtained less than 1% of the votes in the first election, and over 3% in the second. 
Ericson also ran for Vermont governor – elected every two years – in every election 
                                                 
12 After his own defeat, Malone was elected Treasurer and Receiver-General for Massachusetts in 1990, 
serving two four-year terms. In 1998, he lost a Republican primary to incumbent Governor Paul Cellucci, 
Mitt Romney’s predecessor. 
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between 2002 and 2014, failing to obtain more than 2% in all of these races. 
Additionally, she has ran for a senatorial or U.S. House seat every two years between 
2004 and 2016, either as an independent or as a member of the United States Marijuana 
Party, with little success.13 
By looking at the varying paths that electorally unsuccessful candidates take, 
despite all undergoing the same treatment at one point in time, we can better appreciate 
the nuances regarding the topic of also-rans in electoral politics. The current research 
picture seems incomplete due to a lack of exploration of the expectations that both 
candidates and political parties have both before and after an election happens. It can be 
argued that both actors have a set of expectations – sometimes similar, sometimes not 
as much – as to how well they will do in an election, developing strategies in case they 
lose their race. If those expectations are surpassed, strategies and goals can change, and 
candidates can gain a better standing within the party, allowing for the opportunity to 
nurture a political career. Conversely, if expectations are not met, things can change for 
the worse. 
Losing Candidates and Political Parties 
Regarding candidate nomination and prospects for candidates after elections are 
finished, political parties have a pivotal role. Generally, parties have most of the 
leverage when it comes to the decision to re-nominate candidates. However, mediating 
factors like electoral over-performance or the retirement of a powerful incumbent can 
help candidates obtain a re-nomination in a contested district. Additionally, the history 
                                                 
13 More on Ericson’s electoral history is available at https://ballotpedia.org/Cris_Ericson 
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of the candidates can become a factor in their prospects. For example, there is evidence 
of a greater electoral success at the legislative level for candidates holding local election 
in the past (Put and Maddens, 2014), and for better fundraising abilities for politicians 
who held a seat in a state legislature (Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999). 
Similarly, in close districts, parties can stand to win if they take a second look at 
their also-rans instead of banking it all on a new candidate without an electoral defeat 
in their resume. If the losing candidate improved the usual party showing in the district 
and another shot could help them jump the hurdle, the choice in favor of an also-ran 
with history in the district appears easier to make (Ackerman, 1957). Moreover, 
differences can be observed in the chamber that candidates are running, given inherent 
differences in notoriety and recognition. Thus, a senatorial also-ran could try her luck 
again in the same race and pull off an upset a second time around because the differences 
in recognition between challengers and incumbents are small (Hinckley, 1980). 
Political parties are pivotal in this process, betting on formerly unsuccessful 
politicians in some districts while working out different scenarios with also-rans who 
do not seem fit for another electoral race. However, parties behave differently, and while 
some have a greater leeway to nominate candidates, others may choose to capitulate to 
the popularity of some of their hopefuls for electoral gains (Jacobson, 2017) or to some 
district characteristics that allowed for challenger emergence, like their vote on a 
previous election or the historical advantage of the party in the bailiwick (Hogan, 2004). 
Parties face trade-offs when looking for new challengers, risking losing quality 
candidates in search of better prospects. Where parties are weak, they “lack mechanisms 
to enforce discipline and constrain politicians’ actions. In turn, this gives politicians 
 32 
incentives to shirk, particularly when reelection is not an option and it is easy to continue 
a political career with a different party” (Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017: 145). Conversely, 
when parties are strong, they can deploy a lineup of strong candidates and develop a 
strategy of consolation prizes to appease losing candidates with a desirable appointment 
(Carey and Siavelis, 2003). 
Then, bringing politicians from other parties can signify a turn towards success. 
In the cases of Ronald Reagan and Michael Bloomberg, their changes of party paid off. 
The former secured the Governorship of California and eventually the presidency in 
1974, while Bloomberg won the New York City mayoral seat for three terms after 
switching from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Arguably, political parties have 
their own strategies in given elections, and it becomes important to determine what 
parties will nominate different types of candidates, and to what extent can losing 
candidates seek nominations from parties to maximize their chances of winning a seat.  
The party change from Michael Bloomberg, despite not happening because of 
an electoral loss, helped him win a seat and advance his political career. A longtime 
Democratic Party supporter, he switched to the Republican party to run in the 2001 
mayoral election.14 Bloomberg is perhaps an exception in the sense that the party sought 
him as a candidate rather than the other way around. After this switch, Bloomberg was 
re-elected two more times, and left the Republican Party in 2007, though he ran as their 
member in the 2009 election.15 He ended up being the mayor of New York City between 
2001 and 2013. After his stint, he eventually re-joined the Democratic Party, and 
                                                 
14 https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/23/politics/michael-bloomberg-president-2016/ 
15 https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Bloomberg 
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endorsed Hillary Clinton for the 2016 presidential election. He is reportedly weighing a 
2020 presidential run as part of the Democratic Party.16 
Further, the mechanisms within political parties can be stronger in some 
countries, and weaker in others. This can affect the rate in which politicians switch 
allegiances, because weaker parties can be perceived as vehicles to promote the political 
careers of ambitious politicians more than a platform that candidates align with to pass 
policies over time. In his 2006 article, Desposato offers a model of party switching, and 
in the case of Brazil, he finds that parties are “for rent”, serving to advance personal 
careers in detriment of institutional advancement (Desposato, 2006: 77). This 
arrangement leaves parties as instruments for the short-term electoral success of 
politicians, becoming easier for also-rans to look for new pastures to resurrect their 
chances to win a future election, sometimes despite a bad electoral showing. 
Generally, party switching is a strategy that follows a calculus of candidacy and 
party affiliation, following a rational utility maximization decision (Aldrich and Bianco, 
1992: 115). Thus, if parties have less stringent requisites for candidates, it makes sense 
for an also-ran who sees better prospects outside of the party to look for another place 
to launch their re-nomination attempts. In particular, and according to Schlesinger 
(1994), the United States has developed a party system that takes political ambition and 
channels it, allowing individual politicians to put forth as much effort to realize their 
own ambitions, but also to restrain themselves if the issue has the potential to erode the 
political system (Schlesinger, 1994: 37).  
                                                 
16 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-president-2020.html 
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An example of a candidate who switched parties after losing a primary election 
and was able to win the general race was Congressman and former mayor of New York, 
the late John Lindsay. After being re-elected three times for the 17th Congressional 
District seat of the state of New York in the 1950s, Lindsay resigned shortly thereafter 
to run for mayor of New York City as a Republican, the same party he represented in 
the House. He won that election, but when starting his path towards re-election, he was 
defeated in the Republican primary. Despite this, he remained in the ballot as the 
candidate for the New York Liberal Party, and eventually won the 1969 election, 
defeating the candidate who beat him in the primary (Cannato, 2001). 
A second consideration that affects losing candidates is their relationship with 
the party that nominates them. If parties re-nominate candidates, it is important to note 
in which part of the spectrum these also-rans are located, as it is arguably more likely 
that over-performers will be re-nominated for the same seat more than under-
performers. Thus, parties have a rational decision to make when thinking about an 
election, and they need to evaluate the “demand” for a candidate in a district, that can 
remain positive even after an electoral setback. Generally speaking, parties and 
coalitions should decide if to pursue office, votes, or policy (Budge and Laver, 1986; 
Strøm, 1990), and that decision helps separate candidates, giving more chances to those 
with the greater potential to achieve the party goals for that district and survive 
politically (Leoni et al., 2004). 
In this sense, parties can be in the market for former losers who ran for other 
parties in the past, given the slight advantage in information when compared to amateurs 
with no previous experience in politics. Just as politicians have their own rational 
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decisions to make, and at times decide to run in races that seem hard to win, parties have 
their own motivations that seek to maximize their chances for success as well. In some 
cases, a greater degree of party switching within a system can be a sign of a dynamic 
system, and not of a crisis. In their 2011 article, McMenamin and Gwiazda focus on the 
high degree of party switching from candidates at the legislative level in Poland to show 
how vote-seeking candidates look to survive in electoral politics. In cases like these, 
changing allegiances is not a bug but rather a feature of the system, and one that 
candidates and parties are aware of when trying to maximize their chances of success. 
Another practical limitation for candidates is that in the top hierarchies of power, 
there are less popularly elected seats than at the state or local levels. For example, the 
Texas legislature is formed of 31 senatorial seats and 150 House seats, while the number 
of seats for Texas in the U.S. legislature is 2 for the Senate, and 36 for the House. This 
creates another constraint for parties and candidates, and those who have lost an election 
have one more strategy to think about when looking to advance their political careers.  
To exemplify this, we can think of a political party competing for two different 
seats in the same election. For seat X, the party is looking to nominate a strong 
challenger against a weak incumbent, while for seat Y, the party is faced with an open 
seat and they know this district favors them. For seat X, the party gambles on a veteran 
former representative for that district who lost the previous election, while seat Y sees 
an amateur also-ran who over-achieved in a past election. By nominating an established 
politician in one district and a dark horse in the other, the party maximized its chances 
of winning both seats. 
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These dynamics – both within and across systems – help us wonder in what 
circumstances a political party will nominate the different types of also-rans that our 
two dimensions help generate. Parties themselves have varying expectations and goals 
in every election, and they can decide towards one type of candidate in one election and 
another type in a different race. Relatedly, they can choose one type one given year and 
a different one at a different time. Finally, parties also develop their own strategies after 
comparing themselves to other parties in the same system.  
In a similar way, other parties will have different strategies for similar districts. 
If a third party – which would have a bigger pool of also-rans, given their inability to 
become one of the two major parties – wants to compete for those seats, they ought to 
nominate their strongest also-rans. However, if their intention is to mobilize different 
groups of the population to try to influence a particular set of policies, and not 
necessarily to win office, parties can choose a losing candidate who appeals better to 
those groups with a more long-term strategy. These types of candidates have been called 
sacrificial lambs (Canon, 1993), because they face bad odds of winning in tough 
districts, but their campaigns can still be put to good use. 
With that said, the passage of time provides us with more nuance regarding 
candidates who were inexperienced amateurs in their first attempts at winning office. 
Also-rans who did not perform at the level they expected, or who ran knowing they 
would lose can benefit from time passing, and their modified strategies can eventually 
pay off. Therefore, we can think of under-performing amateur politicians who 
developed over time, updated their expectations and strategies, ran again with these 
modifications and eventually won a popularly elected seat.  
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Conclusions 
Every election draws losing candidates, and despite the belief that winning is the 
only way to stay relevant in politics and influence policy, a significant number of also-
rans can develop stable political careers and maintain a role in electoral politics despite 
losing elections. This chapter offered a novel theory on losing candidates, focusing on 
the electoral experience and performance of hopefuls affecting their chances of re-
nomination for future elections. Different degrees of experience and performance help 
explain why losing candidates are not created equal, and we can expect them to have 
their own set of expectations and strategies looking forward to new elections. 
Because of the extreme focus of the literature on winning candidates, the factors 
that help explain the varying paths from also-rans have been systematically under-
explained by most of the literature on electoral politics. As noted, the main contention 
of this project is that not every losing candidate is the same, and a better comprehension 
of the ways also-rans can differ from each other is necessary to understand why the 
paths they follow over time can be so distinct.  
The typology of losing candidates offered in this chapter consists of two 
moments, one before and one after the election, which serve as signals for political 
parties and candidates when considering future contests. The ex-ante moment is a 
consideration of the electoral experience of the candidate, with politicians who have 
participated in more than two elections classified as veterans, while candidates with less 
than that considered as amateurs. After elections are contested, parties have a second 
marker for candidates who performed better than previous losers. Different levels of 
experience and performance from also-rans help us understand the different outcomes 
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they take after losing an election. And we can anticipate that a better electoral 
performance compared to previous losers in the same district will be re-nominated more. 
This categorization helps politicians and political parties when thinking about 
future elections, and to distinguish their candidates in the also-ran pool. At the same 
time, parties may differ in their ways of dealing with candidates, at times preferring one 
type while in other times leaning for another type. This depends on the needs of the 
party for the district they are seeking to win. In other words, not every losing candidate 
is the same, and this shows the different paths followed by them.  
For example, a resourceful candidate who was just dealt electoral defeat after 
her second election can be expected to try to win office one more time, given the alleged 
bump from one election to the next in terms of experience. If she can maintain her 
connections, she seems an even stronger candidate for a repeat election (Mack, 1998), 
and certainly a threat to other, less connected candidates who lack the quality boost of 
having a couple of elections under her belt. With that said, there is also evidence that 
repeat challengers are not more likely to defeat an incumbent than two first-time 
candidates in consecutive elections (Squire and Smith, 1984). 
Conversely, a first-time candidate with few resources who also experienced 
electoral defeat might not seek a re-nomination if they were considered sacrificial lambs 
– or candidates with the only goal to lose an election – by the party to begin with. But 
the opposite can be true if they have enough leeway to acquire more experience in 
another election without a big expectation of winning a seat. There might come a time 
when a former sacrificial lamb acquires enough experience and performs better over 
time, to guarantee more resources and support from his party in a future election. 
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Further, in systems with strong parties in which they provide insurance to strong 
candidates with a high risk of losing, electoral defeat is of less importance than for an 
independent candidate with limited resources. For the former, losing is part of the bigger 
game that parties are playing to increase their representation within the political system, 
and is more a part of how the game is played than a meaningful consequence. If career-
minded politicians can secure a job that provides good benefits, losing an election at 
one point in time can just be a means to a greater, more ambitious end. 
Similarly, other career-seeking politicians can acquire experience in running for 
elections and not develop an expectation of winning, but only to propose policy changes. 
They might seek to run for office in the future just to moderate other candidates’ 
positions and prove that policy-seeking politics is also a legitimate way to play the 
game. All in all, losing an election can help galvanize features that were already salient 
for each of these types of candidates. In this sense, losing an election can help us identify 
who is an able candidate to come back for another shot at office, and who is not, and 
perhaps never meant to be in electoral politics. 
The next chapter deals with the selection of the Chilean case as the country to 
explore in this project, focusing on two main reasons. First, the Chilean legislative 
electoral system featured the binominal arrangement from 1989 to 2013, with a 
magnitude of two seats across all districts. This, combined with two very strong 
coalitions fighting for virtually all seats, summoned two pairings of strong candidates 
to win two seats for the same coalition. However, because that was not an easy feat, two 
powerful and resourceful candidates turned out to be losers that could be recalled for 
more elections in the future. We will be testing this relationship later in chapter 3. 
 40 
Second, election results of the concurrent presidential races have also revealed 
the coalition that controls the executive, and the new president has had at his disposal a 
series of appointments. After the first seven legislative elections between 1989 and 
2013, this prerogative has been used to reward good losers that parties consider can be 
better suited for a position in the executive power. We will test the determinants of this 
system of insurance for good losers over the years, both under the binomial system and 
the new electoral system that debuted with the 2017 legislative races, in more detail in 
chapter 4. 
To finalize, losing candidates are not simple residuals of the electoral process 
and are seen by parties and coalitions as important actors in politics. We seek to explore 
the reasons why parties give second chances to electorally unsuccessful candidates, and 
what are the factors that help make politicians attractive despite defeat. Thus, chapter 2 
will also present the hypotheses for both empirical chapters, and the expectations we 
have regarding this overlooked pool of candidates in legislative elections.  
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Chapter 2: Case Selection and Chapter Outlines 
Why Chile? 
 Throughout history, Chile has caught the attention of many social scientists. 
Across generations, it appears that the country makes itself heard by a significant 
political event. In the last half-century, it featured the first democratically-elected 
Marxist president,17 a repressive dictatorship led by a captivating yet divisive military 
boss, and a return to democracy which relied on the rules that the authoritarian figure 
wrote to keep himself in power (Garretón, 1991). Moreover, in November 2019, while 
finishing the writing of this dissertation, we witnessed a popular uprising due to 
dissatisfaction with a center-right government that appears out of touch, unable to deal 
with issues like wealth inequality and poverty in a satisfactory way.1819 
  Some of these issues can be traced to the beginning of this half-century period. 
Chile was one more in the long list of South American countries that underwent a 
military dictatorship in the 1970s. Despite having a similar fate at the time as many of 
the countries in the region, Chile also had exceptional circumstances that marked the 
breakdown of democracy. For example, Sigmund (2003) claims that a crisis of 
legitimacy eventually led to the military, a body thought of as “legalistic, 
constitutionalist, and professional” (p. 242) for decades, to become politically active 
and orchestrate the coup that ousted Socialist president Salvador Allende in September 
of 1973. 
                                                 
17 For a BBC profile of Allende, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3089846.stm 
18 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/americas/chile-protests.html 
19 https://time.com/5718241/protests-chile-resume-economy/ 
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 Naturally, the causes for the democratic collapse also touch on the location of 
the region in the context of international politics. The deployment of the Operación 
Cóndor – a doctrine of continental security that sought to share intelligence across the 
South American military states to deal swiftly with political opponents, with tactics that 
included torture and assassination – is an overt sign of American involvement in the 
region (McSherry, 2005). Further, studies have suggested a heightened role of the 
United States in the toppling of left-wing governments in the region (Hitchens, 2001; 
Kornbluh, 2013), and more recent evidence suggests a significant role of the World 
Bank, with its loans providing some much-needed legitimacy for an authoritarian 
regime looking to improve its standing after egregious human right violations (Kedar, 
2018). 
 During the authoritarian regime, Pinochet sought to build a framework to 
transition to a democratic system (Garretón, 1995: 148), overseeing the writing of a new 
constitution ultimately ratified in 1980. Ultimately, this document would serve the 
opposition with the key to the end of the authoritarian regime, and a way for the 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia – the center-left coalition opposing 
Pinochet – to win the game playing by the rules set by the authoritarian ruler himself. 
 The document established the election of a future president for the period 1989-
1997, subject to a popular plebiscite. If the name proposed by the Commanders-in-chief 
of the armed forces was accepted by voters, that person would assume the presidency 
immediately while a bicameral Congress was set to be elected a year later.20 In turn, if 
                                                 
20 The first democratic Congress also included nine designated Senators (Senadores designados), a figure 
that was included in the 1980 constitution. Similarly, former presidents serving more than six continuous 
years were to be named lifelong Senators (Senadores vitalicios). While designated Senators were 
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this person was rejected, Pinochet would stay in power for one more year until 
democratic elections for president and Congress were held (Garretón, 1988: 22-3). This 
referendum was celebrated on October 5th, 1988, and Pinochet – who ended up being 
proposed as the candidate to lead the country for eight more years – lost the election 
somewhat unexpectedly. 
 This defeat meant that Pinochet could not extend his rule beyond 1990,21 having 
to follow the process he himself helped draw a few years before. Thus, he ruled for a 
year after his defeat, until concurrent presidential and legislative elections were held on 
December 14th, 1989. The first president elected after the military regime was Christian 
Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who obtained 55% of the votes. Those elections also granted 
us with the first 120 Deputies, the first 38 Senators, and a much larger number of also-
rans. 
With these rules, and after Pinochet’s departure, Chile has arguably had one of 
the most stable democracies in the world, keeping elections free and fair while working 
on necessary improvements to its institutions to consolidate the transition to democracy 
(Boeninger, 1997). Despite being unable to solve important economic inequality and 
social mobility problems (Santos, 2005), Chile remains a model democracy to pundits 
in South America. 
An advantage of the Chilean system is the consistency of its institutions. Since 
1989, Chile has held legislative elections uninterruptedly every four years. Chile’s 
                                                 
appointed two times, in 1990 and 1998, only two people got to serve as lifelong Senators: former President 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and Augusto Pinochet. These two authoritarian enclaves were eliminated after 
the 2005 constitutional reform. 
21 However, Pinochet managed to remain a political figure with significant institutional presence as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces from 1990 until 1998. For more on this, see Garretón, 1991. 
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legislative framework has two chambers, a lower house (Cámara de Diputados) and a 
Senate (Senado). Deputies and Senators serve for four and eight years, respectively, 
without term limits. For the first seven legislative contests (1989-2013), the number of 
bailiwicks remained the same, with 60 districts electing two lower chamber members, 
and 19 districts electing two senators each, for a total of 38. This changed after the 
Constitutional reforms of 2015, after law number 20.840 was passed in May of that 
year22. This new law set a new number of districts (Distritos) to 28, electing a total of 
155 representatives, and 15 senatorial districts (Circunscripciones) electing 50 senators. 
After further changes made in 2017, the new Ñuble region was created in the south of 
the country, so there will be 16 senatorial districts starting in the 2021 election. 
Senate elections are staggered, meaning that every four years a section of the 
chamber celebrates elections, while the other section remains in place for the next four 
years. This was established in 1989, where the entire chamber was selected, but four 
years later almost half of the chamber was up for re-election, while the other half 
enjoyed the regular eight-year term. The senatorial regions that elected candidates in 
2017 were the first, second, fourth, and fourteenth, selecting two senators each, as well 
as the sixth, ninth, and eleventh, which selected five senators each. 
Most of the seats across local, legislative and presidential elections have been 
contested between the two most powerful coalitions, the center-left Concertación and 
the center-right Alianza. The former political group was formed by the parties that 
rallied against the Pinochet authoritarian regime, becoming a strong political force in 
the months before the 1988 plebiscite that would allow Pinochet to stay in power for 
                                                 
22 https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1077039 
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eight more years. Following a successful advertising campaign that focused less on the 
abuses of the military regime and more on the bright future that political turnover would 
have for Chile, the group known then as the Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia was able to make the “No” campaign triumph in the polls (Boas, 2015; 
González and Prem, 2018). 
The original members of the Concertación in 1989 were led by the Christian 
Democrats (DC) and the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), along with the Socialist 
Party (PS), Radical Party (PR), the Greens (PLV), Humanists (PH), and other smaller 
parties united against Pinochet. These parties ran in separate lists for the 1989 legislative 
election, however, with the PS leading their own electoral pact that took some seats 
away from the Concertación. In later elections, the PS would return and be part of the 
same coalition that would lead Chilean politics for the first two decades after the return 
of democracy. 
The coalition was able not only to unseat Pinochet, but also to effectively govern 
the country after voters placed their trust on them. Through a combination of market 
reforms – some of them a legacy of the neoliberal military regime – and ambitious social 
initiatives (Toro and Luna, 2010), the Concertación ruled the executive branch 
uninterruptedly from 1990 until 2009. Then, Sebastián Piñera, a successful entrepreneur 
and a center-right politician who voted “No” in the 1988 plebiscite, was able to win the 
presidency running under the colors of the opposing coalition, the Coalición por el 
Cambio (Coalition for Change), more popularly known as the Alianza. 
This political partnership stemmed from politicians who supported Pinochet’s 
regime and opposed the ideology of the Concertación. The Alianza was formed 
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originally by two parties, the National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic 
Union (UDI). Piñera was a member of the former party, less aligned with the Pinochet 
days but still proponent of its economically liberal agenda, while looking to form a 
democratic center-right coalition (Valenzuela, 1995). The UDI is a closer follower to 
the Pinochet ideology, highlighted by its founder Jaime Guzmán, ultimately killed by 
the left-wing Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) in 1991. Guzmán led a group 
of right-wing thinkers that saw the UDI as a civilian successor to the dictatorship 
(Barros, 2002). 
These two coalitions have helped fill the political space that the former “three-
thirds” filled in the period before the military coup of 1973 (Montes et al., 2000; 
Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). The three forces represented by Communists and 
Socialists, Christian Democrats, and the center-right National Party that were 
mainstream in the two decades before the military uprising have been reproduced 
through the prism of a duopoly. Because of this, and partly because of the restrictive 
character of the binominal electoral system in the legislature, it was more feasible that 
more parties joined the Concertación than a third-force breaking with this duopoly.  
Thus, for the 2009 legislative election, the Communist Party (PC) joined the 
coalition in an agreement that would allow PC candidates to appear in the ballot while 
historical coalition parties would abstain from running their candidates in those districts. 
In turn, the PC would support the Concertación candidate for the presidency, Eduardo 
Frei (Passarelli, 2011: 75-6). Until 2018, when the Concertación as we know it was 
disbanded, the PC continued to be a part of the center-left coalition. However, some DC 
members showed signs of discontent, and a handful of career politicians left the party 
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and formed the Independents’ Regionalist Party (PRI), that eventually joined the 
Alianza in the 2017 legislative election (Luna and Mardones, 2010). 
Another dynamic that was observed in the Chilean case from 1989 to 2013 was 
the within-party negotiation at the time of the nomination of candidates, especially in 
the case of the Concertación. Because of the number of parties forming the center-left 
coalition, deciding on two candidates per district always led to negotiation issues. In 
some instances, parties had to withdraw from districts and risk losing their ties with the 
electorate, while leaving good candidates out of elections (Gamboa and Morales, 2016: 
137).23 This problem was deepened further after the PC joined the coalition and won 
seats in the 2009 legislative election. 
The continuous requirement for the coalition to appear competitive across all 
districts is driven partly by the additional need to mobilize people for the concurrent 
presidential elections. In the case where a coalition did not have control of the district, 
parties within the group still had a vested interest in keeping voters engaged with their 
national platforms and the candidates they were supporting in the presidential race. 
Except for the legislative elections of 1997 and 2001, all other races were concurrent 
with a presidential election. 
All this contrasts with, for example, the American case. Here, powerful 
incumbents from one party can scare off all potential challengers from other parties, 
running unopposed – or against easy third-party opposition – for another term. Hence, 
                                                 
23 Moreover, Gamboa and Morales (2016) claim that the increasing problems in negotiation for candidate 
nomination was a main factor leading to the change in the electoral system. They argue that these 
problems were more important than seeking a more proportional system, something that all parties said 
they were after for electoral reasons. 
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in some districts, the decision to run is left to the candidates, so self-selection becomes 
a very important consideration in the U.S. (Aldrich, 2011; Banks and Kiewiet, 1989; 
Kazee and Thornberry, 1990; Thomsen, 2014). In the end, the need to mobilize party 
voters for other elections appears irrelevant in presidential election years, while not 
being present in midterm election years. 
As we can see, despite a strong dominance of a duopoly, the partisan dynamics 
of the Chilean political system are rich and varied, and they still have control on the 
nomination of their candidates. With that said, the sometimes-intense process of 
negotiation within coalitions for the selection of candidates can meddle with a cleaner 
analysis of party dynamics. And unfortunately, we do not have access to that process, 
yet we proceed with our analysis of also-rans with the party affiliations we observe in 
the ballot on the day of the election.   
Hence, this project collected the information on every losing candidate in the 
Chilean legislative elections from 1989 until 2017, focusing on the fate of losing 
candidates after experiencing electoral defeat. The main question of this project is: what 
are the determinants of re-nomination for also-rans? We explore this by performing 
statistical analyses that center on capturing the factors that affect the likelihood of a 
losing candidate repeating in the same seat. Additionally, we explore the determinants 
of other outcomes that also-rans go through, like seeking a higher election, changing 
districts and retiring. 
A couple of limitations stand out in our data collection procedure. Because many 
also-rans have at most a couple of appearances in the legislative arena before they 
disappear from electoral politics, it is harder to keep a systematic record for some of 
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them. This divide is even greater in smaller districts with local candidates. So, we lack 
some information that in other contexts is easier to collect, like the candidates’ age, their 
careers before seeking a legislative seat, or a summary of their campaign expenditures. 
In fact, a significant portion of our variables were created out of more basic indicators 
like vote share or repeated appearances over time. 
Yet, we contend that at this stage of the project, this apparent restriction can 
become a strength. Given that our main goal is to develop a theory of losing candidates 
that extends beyond the limits of our case study and eventually advances a comparative 
framework for the study of also-rans across countries, the set of variables we have 
collected is sufficient to start us in that path. We expect that looking into the fate of 
losing candidates across more contexts through this framework will be very fruitful, and 
future iterations of this study can include more sophisticated indicators.  
Generally, results of our analyses show that veterans are regarded differently 
than amateurs, with the same for electoral over-performers compared to candidates who 
perform worse than expected. Thus, experienced politicians have less chances of being 
re-nominated and more chances of changing districts, while over-achievers have more 
chances of being re-nominated and less chances of retiring from electoral politics. 
Because we can plausibly expect a compound effect for experienced candidates who 
also over-performed in their elections in their different strategies moving forward, we 
captured the combination between these two markers, adding interaction terms in a 
handful of models featured in the appendix section.  
However, support for these indicators is mixed. Despite the direction of the 
coefficients being in line with the expected effects drawn for our hypotheses regarding 
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experience and performance separately, the interaction terms lack statistical 
significance across all models where they are included. This may be telling us that 
parties consider these dimensions separately. For example, parties are perhaps 
overlooking the lack of experience from a candidate if her performance was stellar. This 
implies that the a priori conditions given by these dimensions are not necessarily 
observed in practice, making the fate of losing candidates a more complex issue than 
expected.  
The Fate of Losing Candidates in Legislative Elections 
Developing a systematic theory of also-rans that builds on the previous 
discussion about candidate quality, partisan support and electoral performance can help 
us understand the paths these also-rans take after experiencing electoral defeat. This 
work seeks to improve the incomplete notion that because losers receive the same 
treatment, they are seen as a homogeneous group of “non-winners”. Yet, candidates do 
not come from identical backgrounds, do not possess the same tools and traits, and 
elections do not occur in equal circumstances. This implies that losers will not handle 
defeat in the same way, that parties will evaluate each defeat differently, and some of 
these unsuccessful candidates will be back in politics sooner or later. 
This section presents four claims that are related to four of the outcomes that 
occur to also-rans after experiencing electoral defeat. Overall, we assume a scenario of 
low information across all legislative elections and a risk-aversion from political parties 
when it comes to their strategies of re-nomination. We can expect that absent all 
information, parties will select a new set of challengers to contest future elections after 
 51 
concluding that the original set of losing candidates is not better than this new set of 
candidates. 
However, this assumption appears to be too strong because parties do count with 
a handful of informational cues to determine the strength of their own candidates, 
including those who lost an election. First, parties know about the electoral experience 
of their candidates, and they can expect a greater degree of quality and know-how from 
veteran politicians (Jacobson, 1990; Mondak, 1995) than from their more inexperienced 
candidates. Thus, an initial consideration from parties is that quality candidates should 
be regarded better than amateur hopefuls due to what they bring to the table. 
Then, a second dimension of analysis is related to the electoral performance of 
candidates. This dimension is relevant across all stages of a candidate’s electoral 
experience, but it has a larger weight for amateur candidates. In other words, lacking 
other informational cues, electoral over-performers will be regarded better than 
candidates who performed as expected or those hopefuls who under-performed. When 
counting on these two cues, parties have more information about this set of candidates, 
and they will tend to choose the ones who stand out in these two dimensions for one 
more run for the same seat. As risk-averse actors, parties deciding for this strategy is 
less risky than selecting new candidates for every seat in dispute in the next election. 
As noted, different values across these two dimensions allow for the existence 
of different types of also-rans. With this, we can expect a few different clusters of losing 
candidates who, after following their experience and performance, will tend to choose 
a path for their futures that is allowed by their parties. First, given that the most powerful 
signal for parties is the one of electoral performance, parties will decide quickly on this 
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front, and try to keep their successful candidates pursuing the same seat in which they 
over-performed. Thus, leaving aside the electoral experience of candidates, and keeping 
all else constant, we can claim that parties will seek to re-nominate their successful 
candidates for the same seat one more time. 
H1: Losing candidates who electorally overperformed in their district are more likely 
to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election, regardless of their electoral 
experience. 
 Next, we argue that the electoral experience of an also-ran can make a difference 
in the nomination strategies of a party. Conventional wisdom suggests that parties will 
fill their lists with winners, but at times nominating an experienced loser can be a better 
option in some districts. For example, in the case of seeking a higher election seat, 
candidates and parties know that appealing to a larger electorate requires better-known 
challengers. Since electoral performance is believed to be a good marker for the 
achievement of a candidate within a district, experience can be a better indicator of the 
quality of a politician across districts. 
Therefore, we expect more experienced candidates to evaluate future moves that 
go beyond staying in their own districts, and to consider seeking a higher election seat 
in more numbers than other types of candidates.24 This is irrespective of the performance 
of the candidate, due to parties considering experience as a more exportable trait than 
performance. From this, we have our second claim: 
                                                 
24 Regarding higher seats, we refer to changes for candidates from one election to the next in the 
following way: if a House candidate moves to the Senate or the presidency for their next election, or if 
the change is from the Senate to the presidency, these are jumps to a higher office. 
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H2: Veteran also-rans are more likely to seek a higher election seat than amateur 
losers, regardless of electoral performance. 
 Third, we build from the structure of the discussion about the re-nomination of 
also-rans to branch out for the explanation of a novel scenario. Along with parties 
evaluating presenting the same candidates for the same seats, there are special 
circumstances where some also-rans performed well enough to qualify for better seats 
within the same chamber. Arguably, parties will try to keep most of their successful 
also-rans in the same seat, expecting that one more election will make them winners. 
But parties also make the decision to switch the districts of candidates in future 
elections. 
 This decision can be tied to the notoriety of the candidates as well as the districts 
in dispute in a race. Particularly, the region where the Chilean capital is located serves 
as a battleground where parties are always experimenting to find candidates with the 
greatest potential to build political capital. Due to the strong emphasis on the central 
government and the executive power headquartered in Santiago, this region has become 
the core of politics in the country. As such, problems in the Metropolitan Region are 
featured more in the news and the media seems to gravitate around the capital, 
overlooking the problems affecting the rest of the country. 
 Therefore, the effects of mass media on the coverage of some districts over 
others is another factor to take into consideration. In large constituencies, it is harder to 
cover all races across the country, hence a hierarchy is developed by news outlets to 
feature more competitive races that cover a larger territory (Clarke and Evans, 1983; 
Goldenberg and Traugott, 1987). Moreover, the general assumption is that media are 
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independent actors delivering the news, but when the outlets themselves have a political 
leaning, we could be observing differences in the content of the coverage as well 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).   
 In this sense, the capital city region is more a battlefield where candidates run 
as partisan stars than hopefuls tied to the people of the constituency. This has a root in 
the literature as the often-derogatory term “carpet-bagging”, referring to candidates who 
run as geographical outsiders, placing less importance on building a local tie with 
constituents in favor of a more general partisan brand that advances similar policy points 
across districts with the same type of candidates (Childs and Cowley, 2011). Gallagher 
(1980) shows that in Ireland, aspiring members of the Dáil Éireann – the lower chamber 
of the Irish Parliament – outside of Dublin need to have strong local connections to be 
competitive (p. 491).  
 Thus, contrary to smaller districts where local politics is paramount for 
candidates to build their political careers (Gimpel et al., 2008; Tavits, 2010), we contend 
that the more notorious Metropolitan Region will be used as a laboratory for the 
development of promising candidates who over-performed in less salient districts, 
exceeding the expectations of their party despite losing. Consequently, this special kind 
of over-performer is given another opportunity to run in a different district, to form a 
commanding pair with other candidates – perhaps shuffled themselves – in a 
constituency that concentrates more attention and may be better to influence policy 
changes that favors parties. From this, we have our next claim: 
H3: Losing candidates who electorally overperformed and ran in a capital city district 
are more likely to switch constituencies in their next race. 
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 Lastly, under-performing candidates may be confronted to the end of their best 
days if they are veterans, or to a hard wake-up call if they are amateurs. A candidate 
who does not pass a key threshold could force parties to start moving on from them in 
favor of over-performers or more attractive recruits. An underwhelming electoral 
performance is the most pressing scenario for also-rans, given that failure here 
undermines the chances of staying in the same district, and does not help in getting out 
of it and exploring greener pastures either. 
This calculus could be related to politicians and parties believing that because 
they were unable to muster a good electoral showing, their efforts will be better served 
in a presidential appointment or in the private sector. Therefore, the proposed most-
likely outcome for this type of also-rans is retirement from electoral politics. Our claim 
is expressed below: 
H4: Losing candidates who electorally underperform in their district are more likely to 
retire from electoral politics, regardless of political experience. 
 The dimensions of electoral experience and performance are a promising start 
to a more nuanced analysis of the fate of losing candidates. A more in-depth analysis of 
this group of politicians is overdue in the electoral politics literature, and the problems 
with availability of information for candidates who do not feature as prominently as 
winners can be a reason why researchers have not explored this. However, the 
dimensions explored here may be sufficient to jump-start a more systematic 
comparative analysis of the phenomenon.  
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Consolation Prizes for Legislative Also-Rans  
This proposed theory builds from a system where also-rans are not only seen as 
residuals from hard-fought elections. In Chile, losers of elections are considered a 
valuable pool of candidates that not only were seen as legislative prospects but could 
potentially serve in positions of presidential trust. One alleged consequence of the 
binominal system for legislative elections was this “insurance policy” arrangement that 
rewarded good candidates who incurred heavy costs after running for a legislative 
doubling. 
A legislative doubling – or doblaje – would secure both seats in dispute for the 
winning coalition within the district. But, the chance of that happening was very small 
due to both powerful coalitions presenting quality challengers across most of the 
districts.25 So, “coalitions face the conundrum of attempting to place their best 
candidates in races where they will gain high national exposure, but at the very real risk 
of defeat if paired with another strong candidate whose party has similar goals.” 
(Siavelis, 2005: 70). This implies that a significant group of also-rans would consist of 
quality politicians that need a larger incentive to run in elections they will most likely 
lose. 
As we propose here and later analyze in chapter 3, parties give their candidates 
chances to come back for more legislative elections. But as we see in more detail in 
chapter 4, an “insurance policy” (Carey and Siavelis, 2003; Siavelis, 2005) was 
implemented by the coalition ruling the executive branch in the form of presidential 
                                                 
25 Doblajes occurred in 65 districts across the seven legislative elections between 1989 and 2013, from a 
possible of 496 districts in dispute over the years. This is good for a 13% of the total races. 
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appointments. These are the many positions that a president needs to fill after 
inaugurated, like governorships, regional or provincial managers, as ministers within 
the cabinet, as ambassadors, or even as CEOs of public enterprises (Gil, 1966). 
After the electoral reforms of 2013, however, the system to transform votes into 
seats changed into a more “proportional and inclusive” system,26 where third parties or 
coalitions could also elect some of their candidates into office. The district magnitude 
was increased from two across all lower chamber bailiwicks to at least three, and to as 
many as eight in some of them. By increasing competitiveness, the costs of losing an 
election have now decreased, and the expectation is that the performance and quality of 
candidates becomes secondary. As a consequence, the role of consolation prizes for 
good losers should diminish in the post-reform period. 
For chapter 3, we measured electoral performance compared to previous 
candidates of the same coalition in the same district. In turn, for chapter 4 we created a 
marker for performance with the “first loser” for the coalition that ended up winning the 
presidential election. This means that the candidate who ended up the closest to a seat 
from all losing candidates in the district, who also belongs to the coalition that elected 
their candidate as president, will be classified as a first loser. With this, we can develop 
our first claim as follows: 
H1: First losers from the coalition ruling the executive branch are more likely to be 
appointed to a position of presidential trust. 
Similarly, in chapter 3 we used electoral experience as a proxy for the quality of 
a candidate. For our second empirical chapter, we utilize the same marker in our models 
                                                 
26 To access the content of the new law, see https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1077039 
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to determine amateurs and veterans, and we hope that the use of the in-between category 
for “local winners” provides some nuance as well. This measure captures those 
candidates who held a position as mayors of councilmembers in the past but have no 
experience in legislative elections. Then, our second claim states: 
H2: Veteran also-rans are more likely to be appointed to a position of presidential trust. 
 As stated previously, we consider these two dimensions of electoral performance 
and electoral experience as pivotal in the development of a comparative framework for 
the study of also rans. Appointments are not an exclusive mechanism of the Chilean 
system, but the evidence seems to suggest that they are used with the additional 
consideration of granting a consolation prize to good legislative losers who belong to 
the coalition that ended up winning the concurrent presidential race. 
 After the electoral reform of 2015, it becomes imperative to test the 
ramifications of the compensation system that was accepted by all actors after the first 
couple of legislative elections, and to see if that arrangement is still present after the 
institutional change. If the claims that hold that the insurance policy is a result of the 
now-defunct binomial electoral system, then we should expect less appointments and a 
falling out with the mechanism from the current presidential administration. However, 
we generally do not expect that to be the case. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter reviewed the case of Chile in more detail, looking at the 
authoritarian Pinochet days that shaped the electoral rules kept in place and mostly 
unchanged for the democratic period between 1989-2013. In addition, we established 
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the framework to analyze the two most powerful coalitions during this period, the 
Concertación and the Alianza. As two resourceful groups of parties, the dynamics of 
these two blocs function similarly to the two parties in the American party system.  
This way, we observe similar outcomes with most of the seats being filled by 
members of these two coalitions, and appointments favoring the coalition that won the 
concurrent presidential election. The particularities of the Chilean system after the 1980 
constitution set up a legislative electoral system with all districts having a magnitude of 
two seats, which tends to favor the second-most voted group while also limiting 
outsiders. 
In addition, we showed the importance of the Chilean case to analyze the 
situation of also-rans in electoral politics. The critical junctures that led to the 
development of the binominal electoral system are distinct enough, but also not 
exclusive to the country. Therefore, this case can become the fertile ground to develop 
a generalized theory for losing candidates that extends to more countries across time.  
There are two ways in which losers of elections can remain relevant actors. 
These constitute two dynamics that we can witness after following the Chilean 
experience. First, good also-rans can be re-nominated for the same seat in the next 
election. Then, they can be appointed by a president to a position in the executive, if 
they belong to the same coalition, or in very exceptional circumstances. In the two 
following empirical chapters, we explore the conditions that could allow for one of those 
outcomes to occur, highlighting the notion that not all losers of elections are the same. 
Therefore, how a candidate loses an election can make all the difference when assessing 
their prospects and the possibilities that parties give them in the future. 
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For chapters 3 and 4, we constructed an original database with all losers from 
the eight legislative elections celebrated between 1989 and 2017. Some limitations in 
our data are related to the lack of information on the age of the politicians, the careers 
they had before running, and the finances of their campaigns, as these indicators are 
hard to obtain for all candidates in every district and across all years of study. However, 
our aim with this project is also to develop a comparative framework for the study of 
also-rans. So, relying on variables that can be found across all contexts is a strength to 
develop generalizable claims for losing candidates across different electoral contexts. 
In general, we expect some losers of elections to have better prospects than 
others. Besides those also-rans who retire because of old age or personal considerations, 
there will be other unsuccessful candidates who become afterthoughts by their parties 
due to a bad performance. Similarly, there will be candidates who are invited back for 
another try at the same seat, while others may experience a different outcome, like being 
moved to districts that might suit them better. Further, attractive challengers can be tried 
in some bailiwicks and depending on their performance, could be moved to pursue a 
higher seat later in their careers. 
We adventure on some of the factors that could potentially be related to some of 
these outcomes, that we later test in chapter 3. Here, we develop four main claims that 
build on the experience and the performance of the also-ran to try to explain their future 
moves in the realm of legislative electoral politics. First, we expect over-performing 
candidates to be thought of as attractive candidates regardless of their experience, being 
re-nominated to the same seat in greater numbers than other types of losers. Second, we 
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claim that experienced candidates – those with more than one legislative election under 
their belts – will seek a higher seat in the future. 
Third, we expect that candidates running in the capital city will be judged 
differently by parties. The effect of media outlets disproportionately covering Santiago 
districts and declaring some of them as competitive electoral battlegrounds, more 
relevant than most of the district outside of the Metropolitan Region, makes us think 
that there will be significant differences for the fate of candidates. Thus, also-rans from 
capital districts who performed better than previous candidates of the same coalition in 
the past will change districts in greater numbers than other types of losing candidates. 
Finally, retiring from electoral becomes a possibility for under-performing candidates. 
Meanwhile, our exploration of presidential appointments as a reward 
mechanism for good losers in chapter 4 starts with a replication of the work of Carey 
and Siavelis (2003) and their classification of attractive losers as “bridesmaids”. Later, 
we rely on our original database to create statistical models to capture the determinants 
of these presidential namings over time, while comparing the situation before and after 
the electoral reform. We test two claims that are related to the electoral experience and 
the electoral performance of the also-ran.  
Thus, we expect that losers who ended up the closest to a seat in a district and 
who belong to the coalition that won the concurrent presidential election, will be 
appointed in greater numbers than other types of also-rans. Then, we expect some 
differences in the appointments for experienced candidates compared to amateur 
candidates, with the former type of also-ran having a greater likelihood of getting a 
position in the executive than the latter. 
 62 
Over the first couple of elections since the return of democracy in 1989, Chile 
tested its new institutions and developed mechanisms to make the transition process 
smoother. Part of these mechanisms heavily involve also-rans, as parties are always 
aware of their role in the political process and are willing to take chances on the best of 
them. Good politicians can become scarce in a democracy, and losing an election is not 
a death sentence for a significant group within this larger pool of unsuccessful 
candidates.  
We believe that with these two measures of candidate performance and 
candidate experience for unsuccessful politicians, it is possible to develop a first stage 
of analyses to properly assess the role of also-rans in electoral politics, or as part of 
future presidential administrations. With time, and with increasingly more information 
about races across democracies, we can improve data collection on electoral 
competitions following a framework concerned about all candidates equally. This way 
we can find out what makes some previous losers stand out, while others remain in the 
shadows of the victors. 
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Chapter 3: The Re-Nomination of Losing Candidates 
Performance and Experience as Signals to Parties 
 We have advanced that two different dimensions – one before and one after the 
elections occur – affect the fate of losing candidates to a great degree. These dimensions 
are related to the electoral experience and the performance of also-rans. Before the 
election, parties and candidates know the experience of their candidates, and after 
elections have passed, their vote shares are one more criterion to judge them. The 
different degrees of experience and performance are clear markers that parties follow to 
make decisions on the future of unsuccessful candidates and can help explain the 
different paths that they follow after an electoral defeat. 
 Under a rational choice scenario, parties are thought to be acting for their best 
interest and choosing from a limited set of goals. After they witness some of their 
candidates lose tough elections, they are put into the situation of having to decide if 
some losers will be called back into the fold for a future contest. Under the framework 
of free-riding advanced by Olson (2002), we can think of good losers as strong 
individual actors who contributed to the collective goal of the party, which is mostly to 
win elections. In turn, losers who under-perform may be seen as deadweight, and 
ultimately as free-riders who obtained a political good without contributing (Green and 
Shapiro, 1994: 9). 
 Here, we observe a clash between the individual goals of politicians, and the 
goals of parties as they see themselves as individuals within a larger party system. In 
his seminal work regarding the goals of legislators once in office, David Mayhew (1974) 
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establishes that these politicians are “single-minded seekers of reelection” (p. 5-6) who 
depend mostly on their actions for their career advancement, rather than on a partisan 
label. Despite some criticism for an overt simplification of the scenario (see Aldrich and 
Rohde, 2001; Pearson, 2008), when extending this theory to include losers of legislative 
elections, we can flip the role of the actors. Thus, we can assume that political parties 
will have continuous reelection in mind, treating also-rans as instruments to their 
ultimate goal. 
 However, exceptional situations can occur when an also-ran is competitive in a 
tough district, holds some degree of experience, or retains a general degree of 
attractiveness despite electoral defeat. For example, we can conceptualize a distinct 
unsuccessful candidate with a strong appeal to one district. In these situations, parties 
can think of giving another opportunity to candidates who made a name for themselves 
in the district, attracting more voters than a new challenger would have. It is possible 
that “the rest of us cannot understand the representative-constituency relationship until 
we can see the constituency through the eyes of the representative” (Fenno, 1977: 883). 
Thus, a continued relationship between an also-ran and their constituency can reap 
positive outcomes after parties give hopefuls another opportunity. 
 Moreover, these new chances for attractive also-rans may come with the 
expectation of some campaign or discourse modifications before receiving a call-back. 
Losing an election could have been part of the expectation for some candidates, but in 
most cases, suffering a setback will not increase the enthusiasm from parties towards 
their candidates. So, for politicians who supported an ultimately unpopular decision, a 
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conditional re-nomination may be in the cards if that support is spun effectively (Davis 
and Glantz, 2014).  
Similarly, a focus on traits that are evaluated positively by voters can give new 
life to a left-for-dead campaign. If a candidate can become notorious by highlighting a 
positive trait while linking it to policy proposals, their attractiveness can increase 
significantly (Arbour, 2014; Funk, 1999; Salmore and Salmore, 1989). However, there 
is evidence on the use of negative frames from opposing candidates having a greater 
effect than frames where candidates are lauded for having a good feature (Klein, 1991; 
Lau, 1982; Meffert et al., 2006). So, candidates should be strategic in the use of their 
personal features and the frames they use on their opponents. But if successful, they can 
significantly sway voter evaluation and eventually, their vote choice. 
Overall, we see that a combination of candidate action and party calculations 
can yield a significant group of also-rans a new opportunity to run for a seat they were 
unable to secure in the past. If candidates surpass the different thresholds placed by their 
parties, former also-rans can become the hope of a party in a district. Conversely, if 
hopefuls are unable to jump all the hurdles, they could be staring at a switching to a seat 
at a lower election, or to retirement from electoral politics altogether. 
Our theory chapter, coupled with this discussion about rational choice and 
candidates’ personal features, shows that losing an election is not a sufficient condition 
to group all also-rans the same way. Therefore, losers of elections are not a monolithic 
group, as candidates have several avenues for the improvement of their campaigns while 
parties have ample space to modify their expectations for their candidates. 
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Database, Variables and Operationalization  
This project explores legislative elections from the point of view of also-rans. 
Over the first eight elections since the return of democracy in Chile, there have been 
4,466 total candidates for the 1,170 seats in dispute over the years. This leaves 3,296 
also-rans, 2,876 for the Chamber of Deputies and 420 for the Senate. Percentage-wise, 
this means that 71% of the candidates for the Senate were unsuccessful, while over 75% 
of candidates for the lower chamber were not able to secure the seat. With these numbers 
so high, why do we observe losing candidates coming back for future elections? What 
makes a previous unsuccessful candidate come back and run at another legislative 
election? This project explores these and other questions in more detail. 
The theory on losing candidates proposed in the previous chapter advances two 
main considerations from parties and candidates after losing an election, one before the 
election and one after the races are over. The ex-ante criterion is related to the electoral 
experience of the candidates while the ex-post marker is their electoral performance. 
Then, it is advanced that less experienced politicians will be expected to perform better 
electorally in order to continue running for elections in the future, while performance is 
less important when politicians have passed a threshold of electoral experience. 
The table below shows the number of also-rans who experience one of the four 
outcomes highlighted in this project. Since we do not know the fate of 2017 candidates, 
the total pool of losing candidates shrinks from 3,296 to 2,382 for the seven elections 
between 1989 and 2013. We see that these four outcomes cover more than two-thirds 
of all the results for also-rans. What completes the picture are the 593 (24.9%) losing 
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who ran for a municipal seat, not returning to the legislative,27 the 86 (3.6%) that were 
re-nominated for the same seat but after a hiatus, and the 58 (2.4%) who sought a lower 
election seat, moving from the Senate to the lower chamber.28 
Each one of these outcomes are the dependent variable featured in the four 
statistical models shown later in this chapter. The first dependent variable captures 
candidates who obtained a re-nomination to the same seat in the very next election, so 
this differs from candidates who came back to compete in legislative elections to 
different seats, or to the same seat at a later election. What we want to measure here are 
the factors that affect an immediate callback to compete in the next election despite 
electoral failure. 
Table 3.1: Four outcomes for losing candidates  
Outcome N % 
Re-nomination 219 9.2 
Higher election seeking 63 2.6 
Within-chamber district change 187 7.9 
Retired 1,176 49.4 
Total 1,645 69.1 
Source: Prepared by author with information from the Chilean Electoral Service, at 
https://historico.servel.cl/ 
                                                 
27 For a model exploring the determinants of this outcome for these losing candidates, see the appendix 
section. 
28 Additionally, 69 also-rans were re-nominated for the same seat in the next election and yet sought a 
local seat in the next local election two years later, with only five winning their elections. Three of these 
politicians won their municipal seats but had to leave the post in the middle of their terms to run for the 
legislative seat once again, while the other two served the four years at the local level because their 
legislative seat was a senatorial seat where the wait is eight years. 
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The second dependent variable featured in our models captures losing 
candidates who sought a higher election seat in their next race. Seeking a higher election 
is achieved when a candidate moves from the House to either the Senate or the 
presidency, or from the Senate to the presidency from one election to the next. The table 
below shows the jumps losing candidates made to end up running for a higher election. 
Most of the also-rans (55) who moved to a higher election did from the chamber of 
deputies to the Senate, while three moved straight from the lower house to the 
presidency, and five went from the Senate to the presidency. 
Table 3.2: Also-rans seeking a higher election seat, 1989-2013 
 Senate Presidency 
House 55 3 
Senate - 5 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
Of the five also-rans who sought the presidency after losing a Senate election, 
we have the case of Ricardo Lagos, eventual president of Chile from 2000-2006. Lagos 
ran for one of the two seats of the 7th senatorial district in 1989, representing the western 
part of the metropolitan region that includes the capital city, Santiago. Despite obtaining 
a 30.62% of the votes and ending up in second place, his coalition was not able to double 
the vote share of the second-most voted coalition. This meant that the most-voted 
candidate of the second most-voted coalition, the Alianza, was awarded the second seat 
for this district. 
However, Lagos was a very well-known politician in the years prior to the end 
of the Pinochet dictatorship as president of the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). He 
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increased his recognition after appearing on television in 1988, sentencing the end of 
the Pinochet term and accusing his administration of human rights abuses and 
encroaching in power after promising to leave shortly after the 1973 military coup.29 
After his defeat in the Senate, he was named minister of education by the first president 
after the return of democracy, Patricio Aylwin. 
Later, in 1993, he was defeated in the Concertación presidential primary by 
eventual winner Eduardo Frei by a wide margin, of 63% to 37%. After winning, Frei 
appointed Lagos as Minister of Public Works, a position that kept him with a degree of 
notoriety, building enough political capital to become Frei’s successor. He competed in 
the Concertación presidential primaries again, this time defeating his coalition partner 
in 1989, then-elected Senator Andrés Zaldívar (Siavelis, 2005). Eventually, Lagos 
defeated center-right politician Joaquín Lavín, a successful mayor in one of the richest 
municipalities in the country, Las Condes, and another also-ran in the 1989 legislative 
election. 
Then, the third dependent variable is a district change for a candidate. This is 
observed when an also-ran appears in the following election competing for a different 
electoral district, but within the same chamber. Candidates who made this change are 
marked with a 1, with 0 otherwise. The within-chamber distinction is important given 
that some politicians who changed districts also sought a higher election seat, so it is 
important to not include observations that are already in one of the classifications into 
this one.  
                                                 
29 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB925423115611670114 
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Of the total 187 losing candidates who changed districts within the same 
chamber, 167 did it within the lower chamber while the other 20 did it within the Senate. 
The candidate with the most changes of district within a chamber is the Partido 
Humanista (PH) member Wilfredo Alfsen, who changed senatorial seats four times 
every four years from 1993 through 2005 – changing back and forth between two 
districts the entire time – and later in 2013 and 2017 in two different districts. He lost 
every race. 
The fourth and final outcome of interest happens when the candidate retires from 
electoral politics after losing an election. In our classification, candidates who do not 
appear in another legislative, local, or presidential election after losing the previous race 
are considered to be retired from electoral politics. With that said, some candidates have 
come back after many years in the sidelines, so some of the people that today we mark 
as being retired will perhaps come back in a future election. For example, there are three 
candidates in the sample that came back to fight for a legislative seat after 28 years of 
inactivity. In other words, these candidates ran in the 1989 elections and came back in 
2017.30 
As to the independent variables added to capture the four different outcomes 
expected for most also-rans, we have first a variable pertaining to the relative electoral 
performance of the also-ran, compared to previous candidates. For this, we created an 
                                                 
30 One of these candidates found success at the local level for many years and used the notoriety from the 
first election – that he lost – to become relevant in a lower election. In 2017 he won the senatorial seat he 
was seeking. Meanwhile, the second candidate sought to become a representative at the local level but 
was not successful. Lastly, the third candidate ran for a deputy seat in 1989, accrued no electoral 
experiences in that 28-year window, running for a senate seat in 2017 with no success. 
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indicator that shows the differential between the vote share of the candidate and the vote 
share of the most-voted loser in the previous election for the same district (First loser 
differential). The idea here is that if a candidate’s performance surpasses the vote shares 
of the most-voted loser in the same district in the previous election, parties will take 
notice of this and reward this candidate with another shot at a legislative seat more than 
candidates with a lower differential.  
Figure 3.1: Distribution of differential between vote shares of also rans and first 
loser vote shares in the previous election, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the mean of this differential is -12.6%, which signifies that a 
losing candidate gets a negative differential between her vote share and the vote share 
of the first loser in the previous election for the same district, on average, of almost -
13%. The greatest negative differential is observed at -30.2%, while the greatest positive 
differential for an also-ran is 18.2%. 
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Second, we have an indicator of electoral experience with three categories, two 
differentiating between types of amateurs, and one capturing veteran politicians. 
Amateurs are all those candidates in their first legislative election. The baseline category 
for the models includes amateur also-rans with no previous experience in electoral 
politics, while the other type of amateur hopefuls has no experience in legislative 
politics, but they have experience at the local level by having held a municipal seat in 
the past. These local winners have municipal experience but are still amateurs at the 
legislative level. Finally, veteran candidates are all losing politicians with two or more 
legislative elections of experience.  
Table 3.3: Losing candidates by their political experience, 1989-2017 
Year Amateurs (%) Local winners 
(%) 
Veterans (%) Totals (%) 
1993 241 (80.1) - 60 (19.9) 301 (9.1) 
1997 251 (68.2) 14 (3.8) 103 (28) 368 (11.2) 
2001 164 (56.8) 18 (6.2) 107 (37) 289 (8.8) 
2005 187 (59.9) 17 (5.5) 108 (34.6) 312 (9.5) 
2009 211 (61.3) 41 (11.9) 92 (26.7) 344 (10.4) 
2013 278 (70) 26 (6.6) 93 (23.4) 397 (12) 
2017 678 (74.2) 83 (9.1) 153 (16.7) 914 (27.7) 
Totals 2,381 (72.2) 199 (6) 716 (21.7) 3,296 (100) 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
The table above shows the number of inexperienced amateurs, local winners 
with no legislative experience and veterans throughout the eight legislative elections 
celebrated in Chile since 1989. Given that democracy was restored shortly before 1989 
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and the last time Chile celebrated elections was in 1973, there are no local winners nor 
veterans for the first year. Thus, all 371 losing candidates in 1989 are in the amateur 
category. Additionally, since the first local election was held in 1992, no winner of a 
local election sought a legislative seat – and lost – in 1993. 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of electoral performance of losing candidates by their 
electoral experience, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017 
 
To show the importance that this indicator has for parties, we see that from the 
ten politicians with the worst differential, eight retired from electoral politics and two 
sought a seat in a local election that were unable to win. In contrast, out of the ten also-
rans with the best differential, four retired, three were re-nominated,31 and one switched 
                                                 
31 Despite being re-nominated, one of these losing candidates sought a mayoral seat in 2016, in one of the 
municipalities within the larger district in which she ran. This suggests that the party saw her as an asset 
to present for a municipal seat while keeping the re-nomination as a consolation prize if she lost that 
election. In the end, she came back for the legislative seat and won in 2017. The second also-ran who was 
re-nominated lost his 2009 bid, took an 8-year hiatus and unsuccessfully ran for a different district. The 
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her district within the lower chamber to win the next election. Meanwhile, the other two 
also-rans sought a municipal seat, with one taking a 12-year hiatus from legislative 
elections due to him serving as a mayor for eight of those years. 
The box and whisker figure above notes the distribution of also-rans in each of 
the three categories of electoral experience, by their electoral performance. The mean 
of the differential between the share of the candidate compared to the share of the most-
voted loser in the same district for the previous election differs across the three groups.32 
The average differential for the group of inexperienced amateurs is almost -14%, while 
for local winners is close to -11% and for veterans is close to -10%. These numbers 
suggest that the electoral experience of a candidate is a relevant consideration when 
thinking about their fate in electoral politics.  
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of first loser differential (FLD) variable, by 
categories of electoral experience, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Inexperienced 
amateurs 
2,010* -13.81 7.08 -29.47 14.24 
Local winners 199 -10.67 7.35 -25.76 18.17 
Veterans 716 -9.67 8.94 -30.2 18.23 
*The 2,010 observations are the result of the total 2,381 inexperienced amateurs minus the 371 
observations from 1989, lacking a previous election for analysis. 
                                                 
32 Three different t-tests were performed among groups of means to see if the differences in averages 
were significant. Results of the two-tailed tests were significant in the differences between the mean for 
inexperienced amateurs and veterans, and in the differences between inexperienced amateurs and local 
winners. The results were not significant for the difference between local winners and veterans. 
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Some control variables are added to the models as well. These variables are 
added to help identify the relationship between our independent variables of interest and 
the four dependent variables more clearly. First, it is expected that being an incumbent 
before losing the new race may have a different effect than being a challenger on the 
likelihood of being re-nominated, seeking a higher election, changing districts or 
retiring. Next, controlling for the coalition of the politicians allows us to capture any 
differences across groups of parties. Using independent candidates as the baseline 
category, we test the differences that being a candidate for the center-left Concertación, 
the center-right Alianza, and other satellite coalitions has on the four explored outcomes. 
Then, the last three independent variables are an indicator of a Senate race, a 
marker for an election happening in a district that belongs to the capital of Chile, and a 
variable highlighting those candidates coming back from a hiatus. Respectively, a 
Senate race is expected to have a different dynamic than a lower chamber election, while 
candidates within the capital of Chile are subject to a greater degree of scrutiny and 
publicity, and these candidates could be treated differently by parties after an election. 
Lastly, a candidate coming from a hiatus – understood as a period of years longer than 
one term of the last election in which they appeared – from legislative elections may 
hold a different standing from a politician with no hiatus. 
Ricardo Lagos was the highest-voted candidate that did not win a seat despite 
ending up in second place, 13.4 percentage points better than the Alianza candidate who 
obtained a seat in the 1989 Senate election. However, there are two candidates who 
ended up as the most-voted in their districts and yet could not win a seat. Returning 
candidate and previous also-ran for a House seat Enrique Lee finished with a 20.76% 
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of the vote in the first senatorial district running as an independent. However, he was 
unable to surpass the vote shares of all the candidates of the two biggest coalitions, who 
placed their most-voted challengers in the two seats in dispute. 
Table 3.5: Summary of dichotomous control variables 
Variable Observed Mean Standard 
deviation 
Woman 799 0.24 0.43 
Incumbent 138 0.04 0.2 
Independent (baseline category) 103 0.03 0.17 
Concertación 801 0.24 0.43 
Alianza 716 0.22 0.41 
Satellite coalitions 1,676 0.51 0.5 
Senate 420 0.13 0.33 
Districts in capital city 901 0.27 0.45 
After hiatus 169 0.05 0.22 
Source: Author. 
The other candidate is Marisela Santibáñez, a former actress and television host, 
who got a 26.77% of the vote in the 30th House district in 2013 running for the Partido 
Progresista (PRO). Along with her running mate, they were unable to outdo the vote 
shares from the two biggest coalitions, who sent their candidates to fill the available 
seats. However, Santibáñez was re-nominated for the same seat in the next election and 
was able to win the seat the second time. The new electoral system with its proportional 
nature may be to thank for her victory. 
With a centralized administrative system, Chile’s capital city concentrates most 
of the attention of the media and is the target for most policies. The addition of this 
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variable as a control is justified by the disproportionate degree of importance and 
notoriety that the capital city is granted by all actors involved in politics compared to 
other parts of the country. The Metropolitan Region, where Santiago is located, was 
divided into two senatorial districts with eight lower chamber constituencies contained 
in each of these bigger districts.33 Table 3.6 shows the number of losing candidates from 
the capital by year. Our of those 671 candidates, 628 appeared in lower chamber 
elections.  
Table 3.6: Also-rans running in Metropolitan Region districts, 1989-2013 
Year Also-rans 
1989 99 
1993 85 
1997 105 
2001 88 
2005 72 
2009 88 
2013 134 
Totals 671 
Source: Author. 
Statistical Analyses 
The statistical models featured are the full models for each of the four outcomes 
proposed for losing candidates. We see that after controlling for coalition, year and type 
of election, there are some significant effects for the two variables of interest, which 
reflect the different degrees of experience and performance of losing candidates over 
                                                 
33 The two senatorial districts are the 7th and 8th. The former covers from the 16th to the 20th House 
districts, plus the 22nd – an exclusive bailiwick for the municipality of Santiago, the 30th and 31st. In 
turn, the latter district covers from the 23rd to the 29th House districts, plus the 21st. 
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time. We also observe a significant effect of the capital city variable and its interaction 
with our indicator of electoral performance.  
Table 3.7: Four logistic regression models with determinants of outcomes for 
also-rans, 1989-2013 
Variables Re-nomination Higher election Within-chamber 
district change 
Retired 
     
First loser  0.0805*** -0.0309 0.0134 -0.0361*** 
differential (FLD) (0.0134) (0.0278) (0.0153) (0.00824) 
Local winner 0.381 0.312 -0.192 -1.084*** 
 (0.301) (0.763) (0.448) (0.220) 
Veteran -0.335 1.187*** 0.743*** -0.193 
 (0.253) (0.342) (0.208) (0.131) 
Capital city dummy -1.148*** 0.760 1.182*** 0.210 
 (0.308) (0.546) (0.260) (0.175) 
Capital*FLD -0.0570*** 0.0153 0.0348* 0.0144 
 (0.0220) (0.0347) (0.0190) (0.0119) 
Woman 0.259 0.392 -0.522** 0.185 
 (0.197) (0.338) (0.251) (0.122) 
Incumbent 0.693** -0.276 -0.645 -0.183 
 (0.352) (0.698) (0.397) (0.229) 
Senate -1.319*** -0.692 -0.113 0.175 
 (0.401) (0.544) (0.276) (0.147) 
Hiatus 0.482 -0.348 0.0146 0.0269 
 (0.398) (0.584) (0.333) (0.221) 
Constant -0.840* -3.033*** -3.066*** -0.724** 
 (0.458) (0.787) (0.778) (0.302) 
     
Observations 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 
Pseudo R2 0.0766 0.0685 0.0648 0.0417 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include year and coalition effects. 
The first model looks at the determinants of re-nomination for the same seat in 
the next election. The results show a positive and significant effect for both the local 
winner variable – when compared to the baseline category of amateurs with no local 
experience – and the first-loser differential indicator. This suggests that when compared 
to inexperienced amateurs, also-rans with local experience are more likely to be re-
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nominated to the same seat. Similarly, a greater differential in favor of the vote shares 
of the candidate with respect to the vote share of the most-voted loser in the previous 
election increases the likelihood of also-rans to be re-nominated in the next election.  
Figure 3.3 shows the chance of re-nomination in the next election for also-rans 
across several cut points of the variable for the differential between the candidate’s vote 
share and the percentage of vote share for the first loser in the previous election in the 
same district. We see that at the lowest levels of the differential, and when keeping all 
else constant, losing candidates have a very low probability of re-nomination in the 
following election. Conversely, at high levels of this differential, the chances for re-
nomination are greater, surpassing 30% close to the 12 percent mark of a positive 
differential. 
Figure 3.3: Likelihood of re-nomination to the same seat in the next election by 
first loser differential 
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For the control variables, we see significant effects for the Senate and capital 
city dummy indicators. These effects show that compared to also-rans from the lower 
chamber, senatorial hopefuls are less likely to be re-nominated. Similarly, compared to 
the rest of the country, losing candidates who fought for a seat in the capital have a 
lower chance to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. The interaction 
term between capital city and the first loser differential is also significant with a negative 
direction, suggesting that candidates with a greater differential who ran in the capital 
are less likely to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. 
Then, when compared to the baseline category of independent candidates, 
unsuccessful politicians from the Concertación are less likely to be re-nominated. 
Moreover, candidates in 2005 and 2013 are significantly different from those in the 
baseline category of the 1993 elections,34 with 2005 also-rans being less likely to be re-
nominated and those in 2013 having a greater chance. Lastly, when compared to the 
lower house, losing hopefuls in Senate elections have a lower chance to be re-
nominated, and losing candidates from the capital city have also the same significant 
effect. 
For the second model, the only variable of interest that shows a significant effect 
for the likelihood of seeking a higher election seat is being a veteran, when compared 
to amateurs without previous local experience. This relationship implies that also-rans 
with two or more elections are more likely to seek higher election after losing compared 
                                                 
34 The candidates for the 1989 election are left out of this statistical analysis due to the impossibility of 
creating the first loser differential variable. 
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to inexperienced amateurs. Lastly, Alianza candidates are less likely to seek a higher 
election seat compared to the baseline group of independents. 
Figure 3.4 shows the differences in the probabilities of seeking a higher election 
depending on the electoral experience of the also-ran. We see that compared with the 
baseline of amateur candidates, hopefuls with two or more elections in the legislative 
branch are more likely to seek a higher election seat in their next race. With that said, 
the probabilities for this scenario are somewhat low. Compared to amateurs, who do not 
surpass a 2.5% chance at the highest predicted point, veteran candidates start their 
predicted probability of seeking a higher election seat at almost 3%, and they have a 
maximum predicted point of almost 8%. 
Figure 3.4: Likelihood of seeking a higher election seat in the next election by 
candidate experience 
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elections after losing his third re-election bid in 2001. Eight years later he ran 
unsuccessfully for a Senate seat, but that did not mean the end of his career, as he made 
another jump into a higher seat after passing the threshold of necessary signatures to run 
for president in the 2013 elections. Jocelyn-Holt ended up in last place of nine 
candidates in that election, ultimately won by Michelle Bachelet in a second round, with 
a 0.19% of the votes.35 
The other only also-ran that made these two higher election jumps was the late 
Gladys Marín. She was a political activist and a member of the chamber of deputies for 
the Communist Party (PC) before the military coup of 1973. After the return of 
democracy, she ran for a House seat in 1993 obtaining the fourth-most votes but missing 
out on a legislative seat.36 Four years later, Marín unsuccessfully sought a Senate seat. 
However, she was an established left-wing figure and decided to run for the presidency 
in 1999, where she ended in a distant third place with a 3.19% of the votes. This was 
the election that elected Ricardo Lagos over Joaquín Lavín, two other also-rans, in the 
second round after no candidate was able to obtain more than 50% of the votes in the 
first round. 
Moving on to the third model with the determinants of a district change within 
the same chamber, we see that the variable for the first loser differential has no 
significant effect by itself, but both its interaction with the capital city dichotomous 
factor as well as the capital city dummy on its own, with a positive direction. This means 
that losing politicians with a better differential and who are also running in the capital 
                                                 
35 Electoral results for this presidential election are available in 
https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=1 
36 This was one of the 59 districts where a doblaje from the Concertación occurred. 
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have a higher chance to seek a change of district in the next election in which they 
participate, compared to also-rans who did not seek a capital city seat. 
Figure 3.5 shows the likelihood of a district change at different points of the 
differential variable, separated by capital city districts. We see a significant separation 
between the chances of within-chamber district change for candidates in Santiago at 
around the -15% of the first loser differential. From that point on, candidates with a 
more positive differential are increasingly more likely to change districts, reaching close 
to a 20% chance at the zero point for the independent variable, and almost doubling at 
the maximum value for the differential. In turn, also-rans outside of the Metropolitan 
Region do not increase their chances to change districts at the same rate, achieving a 
10% likelihood at the maximum value for the first loser differential. 
Figure 3.5: Likelihood of within-chamber district change by capital and first 
loser differential 
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Lastly, the fourth model shows the determinants for an also-ran retiring from 
electoral politics. One of the variables for experience and the one for electoral 
performance have a significant effect on the chances of a losing candidate retiring, and 
both affect this likelihood negatively. Thus, when compared to inexperienced amateurs, 
local winners are less likely to retire. The coefficient for veteran candidates is also 
negative, but it lacks significance. In turn, candidates who have a better differential 
between their vote shares and the vote share of the first loser in the previous election 
have a lower chance of retiring as well. 
Figure 3.6: Probability of retiring from electoral politics by first loser differential 
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chance of retiring. In turn, at the zero point for the differential, this probability goes 
down to almost 40%. Then, for the greater positive differentials, this chance goes down 
10 percentage points more. 
In general, it looks like an indicator of electoral performance is very pertinent to 
the fate of losing candidates. The better a candidate performs in comparison to previous 
challengers affects the chances of re-nomination and a district change positively, while 
it affects the chances of seeking a higher election seat and retiring negatively. In 
contrast, a marker for the electoral experience of losing candidates seems relevant as 
well. Results of the statistical analysis performed show that more experience helps in 
re-nomination attempts for local winners, and higher election-seeking numbers for 
veterans. Lastly, it disincentivizes retirement from electoral politics for local winners. 
Conclusions 
Losing candidates are an important part of electoral politics. Despite not winning 
a seat, they are a key part of the process in every election, they consent to being governed 
by winners, and some of these candidates become winners after modifying their 
strategies for upcoming elections. This project is the start of a more nuanced analysis 
regarding the fate of also-rans, and in particular, for the determinants of re-nomination 
for losing candidates. 
Taking the Chilean legislative elections as the case study for this work, we see 
that a significant number of losers remain active in electoral politics, with many of them 
evaluating their futures following several factors, demonstrating that not all losers are 
equal. Generally speaking, candidates with more elections under their belts look better 
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prepared to continue in electoral politics. Similarly, candidates who over-perform 
relative to the previous most voted losing candidate in the same district are regarded 
better by parties when considering a re-nomination to the same seat. 
It appears that the electoral performance of a candidate with respect to previous 
losers in the same district is the most significant marker for a successful return to 
electoral politics. This shows that political parties follow their candidates closely for 
informational cues that would distinguish these politicians from new candidates to 
nominate to the same seat. When there are enough cues to select the candidates who 
already lost an election over other candidates, parties decide to re-nominate the same 
candidates. 
For future research, consulting data on campaign contributions and more 
demographic factors from candidates should add to the nuance in the results. Given the 
influence of money in campaigns, it is reasonable to expect that those also-rans who 
fundraise better should have a better chance at being re-nominated in the same seat, or 
maybe in a higher seat, in greater numbers than those unsuccessful candidates with 
lesser abilities to fundraise. 
Similarly, knowing more details about the candidates themselves can bring more 
details into light. For example, older candidates may just be deciding to retire because 
they are old, and no other factor affect their calculus. Similarly, candidates that are 
young may consider it rational to lose a few elections and may decide to continue to run 
despite not being electorally successful, in the chance that at a later age and with some 
electoral experience they could compete in better foot against an incumbent. 
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This project is just the start of a more detailed study about losing candidates and 
political parties in electoral politics. We hope to have piqued the interest of more 
researchers and we hope to have contributed to the development of a comparative theory 
of also-rans. After all, many former unsuccessful politicians come back and run in 
different elections with varying degrees of success. Knowing which factors may help 
make some previous losers come back to the fold can help us understand – and even 
predict – the likelihood of a politician’s behavior when considering their future. 
As a complement to this study, our next chapter looks at also-rans who were 
appointed to presidential positions of trust in the executive branch. We explore the 
determinants of these appointments and advance that electoral performance and 
experience are again at the forefront of the positive fate of losing candidates. Despite 
appointments of also-rans being a rare occurrence in Chilean politics, they have worked 
as a reward mechanism for good losers. Moreover, our data finds that despite the 
electoral reform of 2015, presidential appointments continue to be utilized as an 
insurance for good also-rans from legislative elections who also belong to the coalition 
that won the concurrent presidential election.  
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Chapter 4: Losing Candidates and Presidential Appointments 
Chile’s “Insurance Policy” for Legislative Also-Rans 
 This project deals with the general omission from most of the electoral politics 
literature of the role of losers of elections over time. The previous empirical chapter 
dealt with the re-nomination of also-rans, and the statistical analysis featured in the piece 
found losers who performed better than the best also-ran in the previous election for the 
same coalition are more likely to be re-nominated for the next election. Similarly, the 
electoral performance and the experience of candidates creates also-rans who are more 
likely to stay in electoral politics, lowering the perceived effect that one electoral defeat 
can have on these politicians. 
Therefore, losers of elections are not a residual category of candidates after 
elections are through. In fact, also-rans remain important actors in a country’s political 
process long after a race is decided. The case of Chile reflects the role of losers to a 
great degree, not only due to the results shown in the previous chapter, but also because 
of what became a common practice over the seven legislative elections between 1989 
and 2013. The governing coalition, having an incentive to win most of the pairs of seats 
in all districts of magnitude two, benefitted from offering an attractive alternative to 
resourceful candidates who risked their political capital by running in competitive 
districts and assumed a heavy cost if they were to lose the election.  
These “insurance policies” worked as rewards for good losers from the 
governing coalition, taking the form of presidential appointments like head of a 
department or ministry, a regional mayor or a provincial manager, or an embassy 
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position. Carey and Siavelis (2003) describe the process as follows: “For strong 
legislative candidates who take risks on the coalition’s behalf by attempting to double, 
insurance takes the form of a promise of attractive appointed positions in the 
government if one should fall short in the electoral competition” (p. 6). 
These policies have been classified as one significant consequence of the 
implementation of the binominal system after the 1980 Constitution (Carey and 
Siavelis, 2003; Navia, 2005; Siavelis, 2002; Siavelis, 2016), and one more authoritarian 
enclave left from the Pinochet regime (Garretón, 1991). However, this system was also 
credited with bringing higher quality candidates to the fold because of the incentives for 
eventual losing candidates. The premises in this literature are twofold. First, the 
development of the “insurance policy” scheme for good losers stemmed from the 
presence of the binomial electoral system. Second, the presence of a high quality of 
candidates is mainly due to this system of incentives. If the latter claim were true, we 
would expect also-rans in a more permissive electoral system to have a lesser role in 
politics after their defeats.  
This chapter evaluates both premises by looking at the presidential appointments 
of losing candidates before and after the 2015 electoral reform. As it will be explained 
below, one of the main changes of the electoral reform was the increase in the magnitude 
district for legislative elections. Such changed reduced the effective threshold for a 
candidate to be elected and lowered the risk for a high-quality candidate to 
unsuccessfully run for a seat. After an electoral reform where the doubling strategy is 
no longer available for coalitions, it becomes important to gauge what remains of this 
structure of consolation prizes and insurance for good losers of elections. 
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The empirical findings show that candidates who have lost legislative elections 
while showing a good electoral performance are still noticed by political parties and 
rewarded with appointments in the executive. This result is observable in both the period 
before and the couple of years after the reform, in the second term of President Piñera. 
Therefore, we contend that the effect of the binomial system on the insurance policy of 
ruling coalitions is overstated, as good losers can still secure good positions regardless 
of the structure in place, mainly because of their inherent quality. Thus, the removal of 
the districts with magnitude two – which helped foster a scheme for powerful candidates 
to run enticed by consolation prizes in case of defeat – does not appear to deter quality 
candidates from running, and appointments of good also-rans in positions of presidential 
trust do not seem to be diminishing. 
Thus, our findings suggest that the new Chilean electoral system creates 
incentives for the recruitment of quality candidates as well as the appointment of good 
losers, similar to the previous electoral system. Particularly, also-rans who are “first 
losers” – thus, who end up closest to winning a seat by being the most-voted losers in a 
district – are more likely to be appointed in positions of presidential trust than other 
losers, both before and after the reform. This shows that regardless of the structure in 
place, quality also-rans do not go unnoticed by political parties nor coalitions and are 
appropriately rewarded for their efforts after representing the political groups in a 
contested election with limited seats. 
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Electoral Systems and the 2015 Reforms 
 Electoral systems are, in short, the varied ways of transforming votes into seats 
(Cox, 1997; Cox, 1999; Nohlen, 2004). They are a set of rules that consider, among 
other things, more or less proportionality, more or less cooperation, and more or less 
competition for political parties within a system. Just as all other mechanisms of 
government, electoral systems are not perfect (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2017; Nohlen, 
2013). There is no one true way as to how our representatives will be selected, and many 
alternative views are backed up by reasonable arguments (Blais, 1991). At the same 
time, consequences of these choices are understood differently by political and social 
actors, so these systems are constantly subject to criticisms and appeals for reform. 
One of the reasons for the change of electoral system in Chile, ultimately passed 
in 2015, was to eliminate the binominal arrangement that had been in place since the 
return of democracy in 1989. The Pinochet regime made sure to leave power with a 
document that would extend the neoliberal plans of the Military Junta, protecting these 
principles regardless of a return to democracy in the future (Couso, 2011: 396; Uggla, 
2005). This arrangement rests on a district magnitude of two for all bailiwicks, and the 
D’Hondt method of seat allocation for coalition votes instead of the share of individual 
candidates.  
Regardless of district magnitude, the D’Hondt method gives the first seat to the 
highest-voted group, and then it divides the number of votes of that group by two, 
running the same “auction”37 for another seat once again with the number of votes for 
                                                 
37 A more mathematical explanation that relies on “selling” seats in an auction-style allocation can be 
found at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucahhwi/dhondt.pdf 
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the other coalitions intact. Then, it allocates the next seat to the coalition or individual 
with the highest votes, immediately dividing the number of votes of this coalition by 
two. If one of these groups wins another seat after the new auction is ran, their original 
number of votes are divided by three before the next auction is performed, and so on 
and so forth until all seats are “sold off”. This formula is mostly concerned with 
minimizing the over-representation of the most over-represented party (Gallagher, 
1991: 34). 
This electoral system was convenient to keep a familiar political duopoly in 
place with a powerful right-wing presence despite being a minority in the polls (Cabezas 
and Navia, 2005; Libertad y Desarrollo, 2001; Rahat and Sznajder, 1998), but with the 
negative externality of shunning independent or third-party – or in this case, third-
coalition – candidates (Carey, 2006). As noted in the previous chapter, the two most 
powerful coalitions in the modern Chilean party system are the center-left Concertación 
and the center-right Alianza.38 These two groups have fought tooth and nail for most of 
the high-profile seats in the country since 1989, and until 2018 remained mostly intact 
from their original formation. 
While this method of assigning seats is proportional in nature, when coupled 
with a district magnitude of two it enforced very high entry barriers for low-support 
challengers (Navia and Sternberg, 2017: 51-2). Likewise, evidence shows that a low 
                                                 
38 These two groups have received different names throughout their history. The Concertación de 
Partidos por la Democracia started as a coalition against the Pinochet dictatorship, while Democracia y 
Progreso sought to be the democratic continuation of Pinochet’s policies. This group changed its name 
to Unión por el Progreso de Chile for the 1993 elections, and to Unión por Chile in 1997, before settling 
for a handful of elections for Alianza. Currently, the ruling center-right coalition is known as Chile Vamos, 
while the center-right group disbanded after Michele Bachelet’s second presidential term ended in March 
of 2018.   
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district magnitude can stifle proportionality more than the electoral formula (Taagepera 
and Shugart, 1989), given the incentive for coalitions to seek both seats if they doubled 
the vote share of the rest of the participants (Salas, 2016). For example, if four coalitions 
presenting two candidates each ran in a 10,000-voter district, and coalition A obtained 
5,400 votes, group B amassed 2,200 votes, coalition C 1,800 votes, and D got only 600 
votes, both seats would go to coalition A. Running the seat allocation as an auction 
taking the highest number of votes for a seat, we see that coalition A gets the first seat 
easily. Then, after dividing the remaining votes of A by 2, we see that their 2,700 votes 
are still greater than the votes of the next most-voted group. 
 This unique set of circumstances incentivized parties and coalitions to recruit 
strong candidates in key districts for a potential doubling. As the coalition with the most 
parties and the one with the heritage of the fight against Pinochet’s dictatorship, the 
Concertación had an electoral advantage when coalescing two of the historical “three 
thirds”39 of Chilean politics (Bonilla et al., 2011; Navia and Sternberg, 2017; Scully, 
1992; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). This meant that the 
Concertación could count on average on a greater vote share than the center-right 
coalition Alianza, but in order to obtain an elusive doblaje, both candidates needed to 
be of enough quality to sway enough votes from the right. 
Given these conditions, the possibility of sweeping a district and placing both 
center-left candidates in the legislature was conceivable in most of the 60 House districts 
                                                 
39 This refers to a moment in the presidential history of Chile where three distinct ideological currents 
succeeded each other in power: the Nationals – seen as a center-right force – placed Jorge Alessandri as 
president from 1958 to 1964; the Christian Democrats – placed in the ideological center – saw Eduardo 
Frei as president from 1964 to 1970, and Salvador Allende represented the Socialists and Communists – 
to the left of the spectrum – from 1970 until the military coup of 1973. 
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and the 18 Senate constituencies.40 However, doublings turned out to be rare due in part 
to the Alianza’s response of placing strong couples in key districts themselves. Thus, 
many strong candidates from the Concertación ended up losing their bid to double. 
Carey and Siavelis summarize this problem here: “The very imperative that leads 
coalitions to run strong pairs of candidates in districts where they seek to double 
threatens the electoral security of their best politicians” (Carey and Siavelis, 2005: 6).  
So, as a response to those outcomes, an “insurance plan” for losers who do a 
good job for the party developed somewhat organically, assigning them a consolation 
prize if their races did not go well. To help mitigate this, electoral pacts assigned losing 
candidates to top jobs in the government or the opposition trenches, as a consolation 
prize to losing a seat that was very hard to obtain to begin with. The governing coalition 
had an easier time promising their potential losing candidates with a good consolation 
prize, given that the executive has control over many positions of presidential trust 
which can be used as a prize for a job well done. 
This mechanism of rewarding strong candidates who lose elections was partly 
responsible for holding the governing coalition strong (Carey and Siavelis, 2005) and 
the political system stable while the country went through a transition period to a more 
consolidated democracy. At the same time, this arrangement helped summon candidates 
who were extremely well-connected, resourceful, and of high quality. So, parties had to 
think of an insurance system to keep those consolidated politicians in the spotlight 
regardless of electoral defeat. Therefore, not long after losing, many also-rans from the 
                                                 
40 The only district under the previous electoral system that ended up being extremely hard for the 
Concertación to even get one seat was district 23, covering the three richest municipalities in the country. 
Only in 1989, the Concertación was able to place one candidate in the House. 
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governing coalition ended up in cabinet positions, while opposition candidates were 
presented as resourceful challengers in notorious municipalities across the country, or 
as top political advisors within opposition parties. 
The 2015 electoral reform eliminated the binomial system, replacing the fixed 
district magnitude of two across sixty Lower Chamber districts and 19 Senate districts, 
for 28 and 16 districts of varying magnitude in the Lower and Upper House, 
respectively. Five senatorial districts kept a district magnitude of two, but the new 
system eliminates the possibility of doublings as understood before the reform, because 
now lists are permitted to present   + 1 candidates – with   being the number of seats 
to elect – and coalitions are formed of multiple parties each (Gamboa and Morales, 
2016: 135). 
Additionally, these changes have the potential of reducing the incentives for the 
two most powerful groups to bring candidates of higher quality to the fold, due to the 
lack of strategic battleground districts and the absence of consolation prizes for good 
losers. This suggests that legislative also-rans could become a less relevant class of 
politicians in Chilean politics. However, we think that the lack of a rigid structure like 
the one before the reform does not deter quality candidates from seeking to run in a 
legislative election. Therefore, coalitions that win the executive branch of government 
still consider losing candidates from these elections to complete their executive teams. 
Consequences of the Electoral Reform 
To gauge some of the differences between the period before and after the 
electoral reform, we first look at the rate of success for lower chamber incumbents to 
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retain their seats. The table below shows the total number of incumbents looking to win 
again and the incumbents who were successful at retaining their seat, along with the 
ratio of success for each. The percentage of incumbents seeking reelection in the first 
six races averages 74.3%, while the rate of reelection seekers decreases ten percentage 
points in 2017. Then, the success rate for incumbents goes from an average of 82.8% to 
a little over three quarters. 
Table 4.1: Rate of incumbents seeking reelection and rate of success, Chilean 
lower chamber elections 1993-2017 
 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017 
Incumbents 87 86 91 92 89 90 77* 
% 72.5 71.7 75.8 76.7 74.2 75 64.2 
Won 70 73 74 77 73 76 59 
% 80.5 84.9 81.3 83.7 82 84.4 76.6 
* This number is calculated over a total of the 120 existing seats in 2013, and not the 155 current seats 
in the lower chamber. 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
 A second exploration concerns the rate of success for different types of 
candidates to win a legislative seat. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of seats won by 
three different types of candidates: amateur candidates, losers in the previous election, 
and winners in the previous election. There is a slight difference between winners in the 
previous election and incumbents, as the latter are considered winners who come back 
to the same seat in the next election. In turn, the former can be winners that seek different 
seats in the next contest.  
For the period 1989-2013, candidates debuting in the legislative fray had an 
average percentage of success – given by the number of seats won divided by the total 
 97 
seats available – of 26%. After the reform, this number increased to 37.6%. Meanwhile, 
losers in the previous election also experienced an increase in their rate of success, going 
from an average of 6.4% in the pre-reform period to a 14% in the post-reform period. 
Lastly, the rate of success for winners in the previous election decreased from an 
average of 64.4% to a 39.9%. These categories are not exhaustive, given that losers in 
earlier elections can skip a few races and come back later, but they collect most of the 
seats across time, making them the most comparable categories across time. 
Table 4.2: Rate of victory for amateur candidates, losers in the previous election 
and winners in the previous election, Chilean legislative elections 1993-2017 
 Amateurs Losers in previous election Winners in previous 
election 
Election Deputies Senate % Deputies Senate % Deputies Senate % 
1993 38 4 30.4 10 2 8.7 72 12 60.9 
1997 34 6 28.6 10 0 7.1 74 14 62.9 
2001 32 2 24.6 8 0 5.8 77 16 67.4 
2005 33 3 25.7 5 2 5 77 14 65 
2009 30 2 23.2 6 1 5.1 76 13 64.5 
2013 30 3 23.6 9 0 6.4 78 14 65.7 
Average 32.8 3.3 26 8 0.8 6.4 75.7 13.8 64.4 
  
2017 57 10 37.6 24 1 14 63 8 39.9 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
 Another consideration that is related to the previous one is the mean vote share 
that candidates need to win a seat. The figure below shows the average vote share 
needed for a candidate to win a seat for the eight elections from 1989 to 2017. For the 
first seven elections, the average vote share that a candidate needed to win a seat hovered 
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around 30%, but after the change, this average went down more than half, to almost 12 
between both 2017 elections.  
Particularly, the average vote share to win a senatorial seat between 1989 and 
2013 was 30.9%, more than doubling the current number of 14.7% for 2017. This 
difference is even more pronounced for the House, as the average for the first seven 
elections was 30.4%, more than three times the current number of 8.7% for the 2017 
race. 
Figure 4.1: Mean of vote share (%) for winning candidates, Chilean legislative 
elections 1989-2017 
 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
Given the new incentives created by the 2015 institutional change, the 2017 
elections mark the beginning of a new era of legislative elections in Chile, with 
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districts depart almost entirely from the previous system. In this sense, we can expect 
that a larger number of parties, as well as independent candidates, will be able to obtain 
strong support to win a seat. 
For the latter, the number of independents rose after the 2015 changes. Like we 
saw in 1989, new elections with open seats and with no incumbent advantage can serve 
as good battlegrounds for independent candidates to appear. For the Chilean case, there 
seems to be a compromise between candidates and parties, given that many hopefuls 
appear as independents but are still supported by one of the coalitions when they decide 
to run. This gives more freedom to candidates to appeal to moderates while still 
maintaining an ideological root to trace to one of the established coalitions. 
Figure 4.2: Independent, pact-supported independents and ratio from total 
candidates by election year, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017 
 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
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Figure 4.2 shows the number of completely independent and independents 
supported by a political pact, as well as the ratio of these two categories over the total 
number of candidates for every election. Despite having by far the largest number of 
independent candidates supported by a party, 2017 does not feature the highest ratio of 
independent candidates over the total number of candidates. This happens in 1989, 
where almost one of every three hopefuls was an independent. Then, the highest number 
of completely independent candidates is observed in 2013.  
The novel character of the 2017 elections, coupled with the increase of brand-
new open seats and a wider space for more political alternatives, gave way for an 
increased role for both amateur and previous also-rans. But this does not necessarily 
translate into these elections suffering from a lower candidate quality. In the next section 
we explore how presidential appointments became a tool to gauge the quality of 
legislative candidates, and a mechanism to reward politicians who are seen as politically 
viable by political parties, despite experiencing electoral defeat.  
Doublings, Appointments, and the Fate of Losing Candidates 
 We have advanced that the previous electoral system developed an insurance 
scheme for losing candidates who ran in competitive districts and had a significant 
chance to lose the election. The main objective was to double the vote share of other 
coalitions, but many times this did not occur. A doblaje happened when two candidates 
of the same coalition double the vote share of the second-most voted coalition and win 
both district seats, being a pivotal addition to the constitutional reforms of 1989.41  
                                                 
41 See article 109 bis added in 1989 here: 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30177&buscar=18799 
 101 
Doublings occurred a total of 65 times over the first seven elections. Table 4.3 
shows the doublings by year and by election, and by the coalitions that were able to win 
both seats in one district. In raw numbers, 58 doublings occurred in the lower chamber, 
and 59 of the total 65 were done by the Concertación coalition, who were also 
responsible for all the Senate doublings. The only doblaje that the Alianza coalition was 
able to pull systematically was in the 23rd Lower Chamber district, that combines 
arguably the three richest municipalities in the capital, Las Condes, Lo Barnechea and 
Vitacura. No other coalition was able to pull a doubling. 
Table 4.3: Number and rate of doblajes by election and year, and by coalition, 
1989-2013 Chilean legislative elections 
Year House (%) Senate (%) Concertación (%) Alianza (%) 
1989 11 (18.3) 3 (15.8) 14 (17.7) 0 (-) 
1993 12 (20) 0 (-) 11 (15.9) 1 (1.5) 
1997 11 (18.3) 1 (10) 11 (15.7) 1 (1.4) 
2001 5 (8.3) 0 (-) 4 (5.8) 1 (1.5) 
2005 7 (11.7) 1 (10) 7 (10) 1 (1.4) 
2009 1 (1.7) 0 (-) 0 (-) 1 (1.5) 
2013 11 (18.3) 2 (20) 12 (17.1) 1 (1.4) 
Totals 58 (13.8) 7 (9.2) 59 (11.9) 6 (1.2) 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
With few doublings occurring, the mechanism of consolation prizes needed to 
be triggered constantly. “For strong legislative candidates who take risks on the 
coalition’s behalf by attempting to double, insurance takes the form of a promise of 
attractive appointed positions in the government if one should fall short in the electoral 
competition” (Carey and Siavelis, 2003: 6). One path for losers of elections is to be 
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appointed to positions of presidential trust, maintaining the potential to develop a 
political career while staying away from electoral politics. This system of consolation 
prizes relies partly on presidential appointments for the ruling coalition, so if a candidate 
from the coalition in power of the executive branch is enticed to run for a seat that it is 
likely they will lose, insurance policies like an appointment will follow the electoral 
defeat. 
According to section 7 of Article 32 in the 1980 Constitution, the Chilean 
president is in charge of naming and removing at will ministers of state, under-
secretaries, as well as provincial and regional delegates. Additionally, section 8 of the 
same article leaves ambassador and diplomat positions to the will of the president.42 
These seats are the most politically salient, and it follows that presidents not only place 
people they trust, but also politicians that are trying to accrue their own political capital. 
To assess where the losers in the Chilean legislative elections have gone over 
the years, we followed Carey and Siavelis’ (2003) framework and collected the 
information of 2,153 appointed positions by the president between 1990 and 2019. 
However, the authors only look at ministers, under-secretaries and ambassadors for the 
first three elections. Trying to minimize the Type 2 error, occurring when failing to 
detect an appointment because of a lack of exploration of some of these positions (p. 
11), we expand their focus, looking at five main appointments a president can give: a 
cabinet position, a regional manager position (or intendente), a provincial gubernatorial 
position (gobernador), under-secretaries and ambassadors. 
                                                 
42 The text of the 1980 Constitution can be found in https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=242302 
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Currently, there are 24 ministries or departments, 16 regional manager seats, 55 
provincial governor positions,4344 39 under-secretary positions (subsecretarías) and 73 
embassies.45 In terms of reach, ministries are seats that cover the entire country, while 
managers and governors are restricted to regional issues. Meanwhile, ambassadors are 
delegates from the country in other territories. 
The case of Michelle Bachelet is a successful instance of a trusted appointee 
who went on to create her own political capital, so much that eventually led to her 
becoming the first woman president in the history of Chile in 2005, and later in 2013. 
The pivotal moment that made people aware of her was in the middle of her stint as 
Defense Minister (2002-2004), where she was seen aboard a tank, ready to help people 
in need after heavy rainfall.46 Despite a paltry showing at the beginning of the Lagos 
presidency as Health Minister (2000-2002), Bachelet found a better fit as leader of the 
Department of Defense, given her family history with her father as a member of the 
military, tortured and killed by Pinochet’s military regime. In her two years, she served 
as a bridge between the military and the people, and voters noticed and rewarded her a 
few years later.47 
                                                 
43 Even though Chile has 56 provinces, the province of Santiago does not have a de facto governor 
position. In turn, it delegates all responsibilities to the manager of the Metropolitan Region, of which the 
Santiago province is a part. 
44 These are not the only presidential appointments. There are also dozens of Subsecretarios (assistant 
secretaries) and over two hundred SEREMIS, or Secretarios Regionales Ministeriales (regional 
ministerial secretaries) to fill at the beginning of each term. In some cases, people have kept their seats 
despite a new president, but this group belongs to the minority, as most appointments respond to each 
president’s level of trust with the appointee.  
45 The source of ambassadors from the Chilean Foreign Relations Ministry featured countries having their 
own representative in some years, while in others the same ambassador was concurrently in charge of 
other countries. Because of this, despite featuring 73 official embassy positions according to our research, 
Chile currently has 76 incumbent ambassadors. 
46 For more, see https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/todo-por-no-subirse-a-un-tanque-nid1241015 
47 For more, see https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/world/americas/profile-michelle-bachelet.html 
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The information on these appointments was collected from several sources. For 
the ministers, under-secretaries, as well as provincial and regional managers, the official 
government sites contained some of the most current information, but some historical 
data was found through looking at www.leychile.cl, the website for the National Library 
of the Chilean Congress, and older newspaper notes from several Chilean newspapers 
like El Mercurio, La Tercera, La Nación, and several other regional outlets. In turn, 
ambassadors were found mostly at the general archives of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. 
Figure 4.3: Appointments by type, 1990-2019 
 
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, at https://archigral.minrel.gob.cl/webrree.nsf/fsRepresentantes 
Various sites in the official Chilean Government website, at https://www.gob.cl/instituciones/ 
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value of these ambassadors can depend on the country and the goal of the 
administration, but as an example of the importance given to career ambassadors, 
Piñera’s first term as president set a threshold of 80% career ambassadors,48 with the 
rest being political appointments. 
It makes sense to think that a career ambassador fits the job better, but there are 
special circumstances that could make a political appointment the better choice. We can 
think of a country in turmoil or with a particular need that only a close delegate of the 
president might help remedy. With that said, some political positions have been the 
target of scrutiny. Recently, at the start of Piñera’s second time at the helm of the 
executive, he faced backlash for the decision of appointing his brother Pablo as the 
ambassador to Argentina. But, a few days after the announcement, the President 
backtracked, but he made another political appointment, naming Sergio Urrejola 
Monckeberg, cousin of the current Housing Department Minister, Cristián Monckeberg. 
Table 4.4 shows the total number of presidential appointments by 
administration, while also noting the years of each presidential term and a ratio of 
appointments by the midpoint of each administration. We make this distinction for two 
reasons: first, we expect presidential appointments made in the first months of a 
presidential administration to be linked to the insurance mechanism for good losers. 
Second, we want to make a fair comparison to the post-reform period, that only consists 
of the first two years of the Piñera government.  
One caveat regarding presidential terms after 1989 is noted when looking at the 
Frei and Lagos administrations. These two presidents governed for six years each, but 
                                                 
48 For more, see http://www.quepasa.cl/articulo/politica/2015/10/la-gran-deuda-de-la-diplomacia.shtml/ 
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after the constitutional reform of 2005, the country went back to a four-year term.49 
Additionally, Frei was the only president who had two different sets of legislative also-
rans to look at, from the 1993 and 1997 elections. This could help explain his lower 
percentage of appointments by the midpoint of his administration.  
Table 4.4: Appointments by presidential administration, 1990-2018 
President (Term) Appointments 
(A) 
First half of 
term (F) 
F/A (%) 
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) 237 180 75.9 
Eduardo Frei (1994-1999) 320 186 58.1 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 382 252 66 
Michelle Bachelet (2006-2009) 313 201 64.2 
Sebastián Piñera (2010-2013) 325 225 69.2 
Michelle Bachelet (2014-2017) 336 221 65.8 
Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022) 240 240 - 
Total/Average 2,153 1,505 66.5 
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, at https://archigral.minrel.gob.cl/webrree.nsf/fsRepresentantes 
Various sites in the official Chilean Government website, at https://www.gob.cl/instituciones/ 
The 240 appointments made by President Piñera in only two years seem large in 
comparison to previous governments. Hence, we added a column with the ratio of first 
half appointments over the total number made for each president. We can see that the 
first half of Piñera’s second term has the second highest number of appointments, only 
after Ricardo Lagos’ first half. And, with the average of ratios for other administrations 
                                                 
49 The document can be accessed here: 
https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=241331&idVersion=2005-08-26 
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at 66.5%, we can expect close to 360 appointments in total throughout the Piñera 
administration, a potential all-time high. 
These numbers show that appointments have increased in use by presidents over 
the years, and this spike could be triggered by the last three administrations receiving 
the executive power from the opposing coalition. The center-left Concertación coalition 
appointed positions of presidential trust after the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2013. In 
turn, the center-right Alianza did it after the two elections won by Sebastián Piñera, first 
in 2009 and later in 2017. Arguably, new administrations have named more positions 
because of the removal of most of the previous presidents’ trusted people.  
At the same time, the government has created more appointed positions over the 
years, when the Bachelet administration oversaw the implementation of the Department 
of Energy and the Department of the Environment, while Piñera promulgated the 
creation of the Department of Sports the Department of Women and Gender Equality, 
and the Department of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation. 
Out of the 208 incumbents5051 registered in those five positions, ten were losers 
in the 2017 election. Of those ten, one is the current minister in the Department of 
National Assets (Bienes Nacionales), another is the manager of the Aysén region in the 
south of Chile, five are provincial governors, two serve as under-secretaries and one as 
                                                 
50 At the time of finishing this dissertation, a cabinet switch triggered by social protests left two 
undersecretaries with no incumbent. Adding the three extra ambassadors for Ethiopia, Guyana and Iran, 
which are normally concurrent with Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey, respectively, our 
incumbent total is 208. 
51 Additionally, the Chilean ambassador to Argentina stepped down from his position in August 2019, 
but the President has yet to confirm this move and name a replacement. 
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the ambassador to Panama. Then, four more incumbents are 2013 losers, two are 2009 
also-rans and two more lost in 1997, while the list is closed by one 1993 hopeful. 
Moreover, 208 appointees had a legislative past, with 165 of them having lost a 
previous legislative race. Then, 190 appointees have gone to a legislative election after 
serving, with 119 of them losing the election they sought. Meanwhile, 22 politicians 
came from a legislative loss and went to lose another legislative election in the future. 
Finally, the number of appointees in these three positions to not have been involved in 
legislative races is 1,804. 
Table 4.5: Appointments of legislative also-rans and effective number of 
candidates (ENC) by presidential administration, 1990-2018 
Presidential term Former also-rans 
appointed 
Average district 
ENC 
1990-1993 19 4.2 
1994-1999 13 3.9 
2000-2005 28 3.7 
2006-2009 22 3.9 
2010-2013 31 4.1 
2014-2017 22 4.1 
2018-2022 30 12.2 
Total/Average 165 5.2 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/ 
To see the extent as to how the winning coalition uses executive appointments 
as a mechanism to insure its also-rans a good place to land after electoral defeat in a 
legislative election, we can look at table 4.5, which features the number of former losing 
candidates appointed to each of the seven presidential administrations between 1990 
 109 
and 2018.52 Then, using the formula for the effective number of parties championed by 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979), we measured the average of the number of effective 
candidates (ENC) for all presidential terms, by district. This indicator helps us 
differentiate candidates who are electorally viable from those who are not, especially 
considering the changes brought by the 2015 electoral reform. 
The table tells us that, despite having the second-largest number of 
appointments, and this number being only in Piñera’s midpoint of his administration, 
the average district ENC is almost three times higher as the one in Bachelet’s second 
term. These findings contrast with the previous information, so a further exploration of 
the phenomenon is warranted. The next section features two statistical analyses focusing 
on the determinants of an also-ran appointment while also making a distinction between 
the period before and the period after the reform.  
Statistical Analysis I: Carey and Siavelis (2003) replication 
 This section features three statistical models, first we see a replication of the 
work of Carey and Siavelis (2003) on the determinants of the insurance policy used by 
the two main political coalitions in Chile for legislative also-rans for the period under 
the binomial electoral system. Then, we develop our own set of models to test the use 
of appointments for losing candidates before and after the electoral reform of 2015. 
Generally, these results show that losing candidates are pivotal to Chilean democracy, 
and that parties follow their performance closely. Throughout the seven elections with 
                                                 
52 It is worth noting here that President Frei (1994-2000) had two appointment instances, after the 1993 
race where he was also elected and after the 1997 election. Meanwhile, President Lagos (2000-2006) had 
one instance of appointments after an election, following the 2001 legislative race. 
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the binominal system, legislative hopefuls who failed in their bids have been appointed 
to positions of presidential trust, and a better electoral performance from also-rans can 
help them land a presidential appointment in the next administration. 
In their work analyzing appointments in the first three Chilean legislative 
elections, Carey and Siavelis (2003) develop the concept of “bridesmaids”. These are 
candidates who were on the lists of two candidates for a ruling coalition in the executive 
and failed to double. Thus, they were assumed to be in the shortlist for a presidential 
appointment after their electoral defeats. Only under two exceptional circumstances, the 
second-placed coalition candidate who lost the election was not considered a bridesmaid 
by the authors. First, if the ruling coalition after the election won no seats in the district, 
neither of the losers were considered to end in any type of coalition shortlist. Then, if 
the coalition won one seat but the other went to a coalition that was not the second-
placed coalition, then the also-ran was left out of the bridesmaid consideration. 
Below is a replication and extension of their work, adding the four elections 
under the binominal system from 2001 to 2013, and the 2017 election for the third 
model. It is worth noting that the Concertación was in power of the executive office in 
five of the seven presidential terms, so for Carey and Siavelis the center-left coalition 
was the only one making the bridesmaid calculus. However, in 2010, the Alianza won 
the presidency, and they repeated in 2017.  To classify losing candidates as bridesmaids 
in this election, there were three criteria. First, all “first losers” belonging to the Alianza 
were immediately marked as a bridesmaid. Thus, if the fifth-most voted candidate in a 
district with four seats was from the center-right coalition, then that candidate was 
classified as a bridesmaid.  
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Table 4.6: Bridesmaids by chamber, 1989-2013 Chilean legislative elections 
Year Senate Lower House Total 
1989 14* 45 59 
1993 9 48 57 
1997 9 45 54 
2001 9 55 64 
2005 8 52 60 
2009 8 57 65 
2013 7 46 53 
2017 5 31 36** 
Total 69 379 448 
Source: Chilean Electoral Service at https://historico.servel.cl/nav_historico.html 
*The 1989 Senate election filled all 38 seats at the same time. Since then, the Senate has been electing 
18 seats in one election and the 20 remaining seats four years later. 
**This number is from a total of 127 losing candidates across 35 constituencies using the new electoral 
system passed in 2015. 
Second, if the loser obtained at least a 10.3% of the vote, they equaled the 
average vote share for winners in the election, so they made the cut. Finally, all Alianza 
losing candidates who ended between winning candidates were marked as bridesmaids 
as well. Under the new electoral system, we witnessed many cases where one strong 
candidate from a party dragged their list partners with low vote shares to win a seat. 
This left many hopefuls with a greater vote share than those dragged winners without a 
seat. Table 6 shows the number of bridesmaids by legislative election, that hovers 
around 60 per election for the first seven contests.  
With this sample of losing candidates, the authors developed a logistic 
regression model that includes three independent variables in order to calculate the 
likelihood of a bridesmaid candidate obtaining a presidential appointment in the next 
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term. They add the chamber variable, that captures Senate candidates versus Chamber 
of Deputies hopefuls; the between coalition ratio that divides the votes of the ruling 
coalition over the votes of the second most powerful coalition in the district of the 
candidate; and the within coalition ratio, that divides the votes of the winner over the 
votes of the also-ran from the same coalition.53  
Results of the replication show a significant effect for the chamber variable and 
for the within coalition ratio for the 1989-2013 period, but not the post-reform period. 
These two indicators have the same direction proposed by the original authors. 
However, despite having the same expected direction, the significance is lost for the 
between coalition ratio variable in the 1989-2013 model. The logic for this ratio is to 
measure the collective performance of the coalition, and the larger it is, the closer to 
double the candidates from the opposition. But races after 1997 tended to get closer 
between coalitions, as there were only 27 doublings in the last four elections before the 
electoral system change, compared to the 38 in the first three races. Likely, this variable 
lost explaining power for the appointment of bridesmaids as the Alianza drew closer to 
the Concertación in votes over the years. 
In turn, the within coalition ratio increased significantly after 1997, with a 
change from a mean of 2.23 for the first three races, to a 2.95 after the 1997 contest. 
The largest difference was seen in 2001, when a Concertación winning candidate 
obtained almost thirty times more votes than the bridesmaid, who obtained 788 votes 
for a 1.33% share. Plus, six of the nine bridesmaids with a ratio of over 10 times are 
                                                 
53 Carey and Siavelis (2003) name these two variables coalition ratio and Concertación ratio, 
respectively. But given that the Alianza eventually featured their own candidates in presidential 
nominations, we renamed these indicators. 
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found after the 1997 election, and none of them were appointed in the following 
presidential term after the election.54 Hence, the changes to both coalitions over the 
years appear to have made this indicator grow in explaining power for these models. 
Table 4.7: Replication and extension of Carey and Siavelis (2003) logistic 
regression model for the likelihood of bridesmaids being appointed to positions of 
presidential trust by the executive, 1989-2017 
 Original Carey and 
Siavelis (2003) 
(1989-1997) 
Replication and 
extension 
(1989-2013) 
Replication and 
extension 
(2017) 
Variables DV: Appointed DV: Appointed DV: Appointed 
    
Chamber (Senate) 1.33*** 0.940*** 0.549 
 (0.53) (0.329) (1.041) 
Between coalition ratio 1.60** 0.281 0.644 
 (0.92) (0.407) (0.603) 
Within coalition ratio -0.11 -0.363*** -0.384 
 (0.20) (0.125) (0.262) 
Constant -5.99*** -1.403** -0.536 
 (1.72) (0.606) (0.905) 
    
Observations 167 412 36 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.0656 0.0725 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Meanwhile, despite having the same direction as the previous two models, the 
variables in the post-reform period model do not hold statistical significance. Likely, 
                                                 
54 Interestingly, one of these bridesmaids with a ratio of 14 in favor of the winning candidate of the 
Concertación in 2001, was named by Michelle Bachelet in 2017 as under-secretary of the Environment. 
He served less than a year, as Sebastián Piñera, from the opposition coalition, won the presidency that 
same year and started his term in March of 2018. 
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we need more elections and more observations to be able to find stronger correlations 
under the new system, or perhaps new models with a greater number of control 
variables, a different sample including all also-rans, and a different approach when 
dealing with the low number of positive occurrences. We tackle these shortcomings in 
the following section. 
Statistical Analysis 2: Presidential appointments for also-rans 
Having shown this initial analysis, we now move to the original statistical 
models for this chapter. To test the use of appointments before and after the reform, we 
develop a couple of models where our dependent variable is a losing candidate being 
appointed in the next presidential term after legislative defeat. Given that the rate of 
occurrence of appointments is low within the group of also-rans, we use a rare events 
model where the dependent variable is dichotomous. This model was advanced by 
David Firth (1993) and is similar to King and Zeng’s (2001) suggestion to reduce the 
bias in estimation. 
The dependent variable in these models is a presidential appointment made in 
the first half of every term from the Aylwin administration in 1990 to the second 
Bachelet term from 2014-2018. We do this to compare results more fairly to the period 
after the electoral reform, which has only consisted so far of one half of one 
administration, the second Piñera term that started on March 11th, 2018, scheduled to 
end four years after that date. 
Out of the total 165 appointments made by all presidents from the group of 
legislative losers of their coalitions, ninety-three of them were appointments done in the 
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following presidential term after the election. This means that after a race drew winners 
and losers, and a new president started their term, they named 93 former losers of the 
previous legislative election in their administrations. Moreover, that number is further 
reduced to 74 appointments when taking out those made in the second half of each 
administration. Lastly, 18 of those appointments were made in the Piñera term in 2018 
and 2019, and the rest were made between 1990 and 2017. 
The main independent variable for this model is the first loser for the ruling 
coalition (FLC) indicator, that captures good performers for the coalition that won the 
presidential election in each of the years measured. We classified a FLC as such if the 
candidate ended up as the first loser in a district and belonged to the eventual winning 
coalition. Thus, there is an element of strong electoral performance attached to this 
variable, because it is not enough to be the first loser in the coalition, but it must be the 
candidate closest to a seat in the entire district. 
There are a couple of differences between the FLC variable and Carey and 
Siavelis’ bridesmaid indicator. First, given the higher threshold of being the first loser 
in the district while belonging to the ruling coalition, not all bridesmaids make the cut 
as FLCs. Then, some candidates that the authors’ original classification of bridesmaids 
left out are considered FLCs by our metric. For example, we include first losers that are 
in districts where there was a doubling. Thus, despite no candidates winning a seat for 
the eventual ruling coalition in a district, in some cases one of those also-rans was the 
first loser in their bailiwick. 
The second difference is seen in candidates who eventually became part of the 
Concertación after 1989. That year, not only the Concertación was running as part of 
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the center-left. The Liberal Party (PL) and the Socialist Party (PS) had their own pact, 
while the Ample Party of the Socialist Left (PAIS) and the Democratic Socialist Radical 
Party (PRSD) ran in a separate group. These parties did not run under the same colors 
of the Concertación in 1989, but they either merged with groups in the winning coalition 
or joined them shortly after the elections were over.  
Table 7 shows the differences between bridesmaids and first losers for the ruling 
coalition. We see that from the total of bridesmaids captured following Carey and 
Siavelis’ (2003) classification, only 280 make the cut as first losers. This group averaged 
a finishing position of 2.86 when including the 2017 elections, and 2.79 with that race 
in the mix. Meanwhile, the 168 bridesmaids who did not finish as first losers in their 
districts averaged a finishing position of 4.99 when counting the 2017 election, and 4.24 
when leaving that election out. 
Table 4.8: Bridesmaids and coalition first losers, 1989-2017 
 First losers Not first losers Total 
Bridesmaids 280 168 448 
Not bridesmaids 18 - 18 
Total 298 168 466 
Source: Author. 
Moreover, we see that eighteen also-rans made the first loser classification and 
were not bridesmaids. Ten of these were politicians who ran for other left-wing 
coalitions in the first election after the return of democracy, eventually joining the 
Concertación shortly after 1989. Then, we have the four Concertación first losers in the 
doubling of the 23rd Lower Chamber district by the Alianza between 1993 and 2005, 
and the one suffering the same fate in 2013. The other three are first losers who could 
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not double along with their pact mates despite the Alianza not winning a seat in their 
districts. 
Table 4.9: Summary of variables included in statistical models 
Variable Observed 
(N=3,296) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
DV model 1: Also-ran appointed (1989-2017) 56 0.02 0.15 
DV model 1: Also-ran appointed (2018- ) 18 0.02 0.14 
First loser ruling coalition (FLC) 298 0.09 0.29 
Local winner (municipal winner, 
inexperienced at legislative level) 
199 0.06 0.24 
Veteran 716 0.22 0.41 
Alianza in power 1,258 0.38 0.49 
Senate 420 0.13 0.33 
Districts in capital city 901 0.27 0.45 
Woman 799 0.24 0.43 
Source: Author. 
Like in the previous empirical chapter, we include indicators of electoral 
experience into our models, and an interaction between the experience and the 
performance of also-rans. Thus, we measure the effect that having local experience, or 
more than one legislative election can have on the likelihood of being appointed after 
losing a legislative election, and a combined variable for the performance given by being 
the first loser for the coalition ruling the executive branch. Table 8 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of the variables included in both models.  
The total number of observations is the 3,296 losers of elections from 1989-
2017, and we see the number of observations for each of the independent variables, as 
well as both dependent variables in the two models. As noted previously, both 
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dependent variables have low rates of occurrence, and our numbers are even lower given 
our comparison between first halves of governments only. 
The first model analyzes the likelihood of being appointed in the first half of 
each of the six presidential terms from 1990 to 2017, and we see a positive and 
significant effect for the first loser variable. This means that from the entire group of 
losing candidates between 1990 and 2017, appointees are more likely to be hopefuls 
ending the closest to a legislative seat in the previous election. Thus, in a district of 
magnitude two, third-placed candidates from the future ruling coalition stand a better 
chance to be called back for a role serving the president than candidates ending up in a 
worse position. 
Additionally, it appears to be a significant effect for the Alianza government 
between 2010 and 2014, the first Piñera administration. This effect implies that losers 
from this coalition were appointed more by that president than Concertación losers were 
by their own presidents. This aligns with what Navia and Sternberg (2017) show in their 
work. For elections where control of the executive power shifted from the Concertación 
to the Alianza, high polling numbers for Piñera before the 2009 election created enough 
uncertainty for the latter coalition to develop a strategy with strong pairings of 
candidates to try to obtain their own doublings. When some of those did not materialize, 
but Piñera was able to secure the presidency in the concurrent election, notorious also-
rans of the center-right coalition were placed in positions of presidential trust. 
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Table 4.10: Rare events logistic regression model for the determinants of an also-
ran appointed in the first half of the following term, 1990-2019 
Variables Appointed in first half of 
next term (1990-2017) 
Appointed in Piñera 
administration (2018-present55) 
   
First loser ruling  3.162*** 3.859*** 
coalition (FLC) (0.382) (0.887) 
Local winner -0.723 0.993 
 (1.455) (0.631) 
Veteran (two or  0.325 -0.262 
more elections) (0.529) (0.753) 
Local winner*FLC 1.511 -1.884 
 (1.585) (1.951) 
Veteran*FLC -0.637 -0.492 
 (0.637) (1.488) 
Alianza in power 1.099*** - 
 (0.348) - 
Senate 1.013*** 1.009* 
 (0.333) (0.604) 
Metropolitan Region 0.205 -0.00547 
 (0.331) (0.587) 
Woman 0.331 -0.299 
 (0.369) (0.502) 
Constant -5.359*** -4.066*** 
 (0.350) (0.416) 
   
Observations 2,382 914 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
55 The last appointment included in the database was the one of Felipe Guevara as provincial manager 
(intendente) of Santiago, made on October 30th, 2019. 
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Then, losing candidates who ran for Senate seats are significantly more likely to 
be called for an appointment than lower chamber hopefuls. Lastly, the variables for the 
interactions between experience and performance do not yield significant effects. 
Hence, these results suggest that electoral performance is a strong indicator to political 
parties – which are soon to be ruling the executive branch – that candidates running 
under their colors are attractive enough to obtain a job working for the eventual winning 
presidential administration. 
Moreover, the second model shows the determinants of a 2017 legislative loser 
ending as an appointee for Piñera’s second presidential administration. The effect for 
the first loser variable is again positive and significant, suggesting that despite the 
change in electoral system, it is still pivotal for the parties that end up in power of the 
executive branch to look at the performance of their candidates in the legislative election 
to assemble their executive teams. And once again, the Senate appears to be the 
preferred chamber from which to select also-rans, as the effect of belonging to this list 
of candidates is significant over the Chamber of Deputies hopefuls. 
Conclusions 
 The reform of the Chilean electoral system in 2015 provided us with an 
opportunity to explore the mechanism of presidential appointments and the role of 
legislative also-rans both before and after the change. The main contention for this 
chapter was to explore any differences in the use of the “insurance policy” system of 
rewards for good losers in legislative elections. In these races, all with a district 
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magnitude of two, powerful challengers risked plenty when running with the goal of 
doubling the opposing coalition. However, the likelihood of that occurring was slim. 
 We took two roads to look at this phenomenon. First, we replicated and 
expanded Carey and Siavelis (2003) work on the determinants of appointments for 
legislative losers. Following their concept of “bridesmaids”, we captured all candidates 
who became potential beneficiaries of a consolation prize from a presidential 
administration that understood the risk those candidates where taking. Looking at three 
legislative elections, from 1989 to 1997, the authors found that Senate candidates are 
more likely to be appointed than Chamber candidates. Similarly, an indicator of 
collective performance for the center-left coalition Concertación positively correlates 
with the likelihood of an appointment. 
 Our extension took those same variables and added the four elections before the 
electoral reform, from 2001 to 2013, as well as the 2017 election, to test their effects on 
presidential appointments. We found a similar effect for the Senate variable, but the 
effect for the collective performance was not significant. In turn, the marker for 
individual performance compared to the winning candidate of the same coalition was 
now significant, suggesting that bridesmaids who under-performed compared to fellow 
politicians who moved on to win a seat were less likely to be appointed. 
 The second tactic we followed was our own set of statistical models capturing a 
set of potential determinants of a presidential appointment. Expanding the sample to all 
losing candidates across all eight legislative elections without any previous 
classification, we tested independent variables that reflect candidate experience and 
performance, and controls for the coalition in government, the chamber, the capital city, 
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and the sex of the hopeful. Results show that first losers, i.e., those candidates that end 
up the closest to winning a seat, are strongly correlated to a future appointment. 
Thus, we see once again that the electoral performance of a candidate is strongly 
and significantly correlated to a future presidential appointment. This result not only 
holds up across all elections under the same electoral system, but also for the elections 
using the new electoral system. This latter point shows that the system of consolation 
prizes given to candidates who risked a significant blow to their political careers by 
running for seats they may not win remains in place, as parties are still paying attention 
to candidates who over-perform. 
All in all, these findings put the notion that the “insurance policy” system 
developed first by the Concertación and later perfected by the Alianza was a direct 
consequence of the binomial electoral system to the test. Our models show that 
legislative also-rans are a valuable pool of politicians who can be recalled for significant 
positions in newly formed presidential teams, regardless of the replacement of the more 
rigid electoral system for a more inclusive and proportional one. 
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Summary and Discussion 
Chile has been studied as a country for its long-lasting military dictatorship, an 
exceptional popular election that ousted the General who believed had eight more years 
of rule guaranteed, a model of a transition to democracy, and a unique electoral system 
for the legislative branch. And after current events, we may get to see a country that 
went through a constitutional reform referendum after civil protests that led to this 
change. In this opportunity, the country served as an ideal case to demonstrate the 
importance of losing candidates in popular legislative elections, as well as for 
presidential administrations. 
This project is threefold. First, we developed a novel comparative theory about 
losing candidates, making the case that also-rans are not residuals to the electoral 
process. This project contends that not all losers are the same, and two things are vital 
for their prospects as return candidates. First, political parties take into consideration 
the electoral experience of a candidate before placing them in a race for a seat. And 
second, after elections are over, they gauge their electoral performance compared to 
previous candidates. Thus, parties decide differently on the fate of their candidates 
moving forward, based on these two moments. 
Second, we investigated the determinants for four different outcomes for losing 
candidates, including the re-nomination of also-rans. We found that candidates who 
over-perform in their races have a greater chance of re-nomination to the same seat in 
the next election. The role of electoral experience is also significant, as veteran 
candidates who lost an election are less likely to retire from electoral politics and more 
likely to seek a higher election in a future race. This entire process is vouched for by 
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political parties, that decide who stays and who goes according to the performance and 
experience of losing candidates.   
Lastly, we tackled the notion that the removal of the binominal system could 
decrease the use of presidential appointments of also-rans by eliminating the need for a 
system of consolation prizes for powerful challengers. In the previous arrangement, 
these politicians incurred in significant risks when dealing with the low probability of 
doubling the other coalition’s vote shares and winning both seats in a M=2 district. 
Because of the non-trivial possibility of losing, they were enticed to run with a fallback 
strategy of being appointed in the cabinet, or as a representative of the executive power 
in a region, or even as an ambassador abroad. 
Arguably, the new electoral system took most of those incentives away, and we 
were presented with the opportunity to compare the situation before and after the reform. 
Despite mixed descriptive evidence, statistical analyses show that the second Piñera 
administration – the first one after the electoral reform passed in 2015 – continues to 
appoint legislative also-rans using a similar strategy than past governments, even under 
a different electoral system. Across both periods, presidents have picked former losing 
candidates that have shown strong electoral performance, and especially those 
candidates who ran in Senate seats. 
These results suggest that losing candidates are not electoral afterthoughts, but 
rather a key component of elections. In fact, they are so important that parties develop 
strategies to reward a significant group of them after working for the benefit of their 
coalitions, whether as challengers in a future election, or as part of a new presidential 
team. At the same time, we showed that the effect of the binomial electoral system on 
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the scheme of consolation prizes has been over-stated, and also-rans of quality are still 
being rewarded today despite experiencing electoral defeat. 
Future avenues for research call for an expansion of the analytical framework, 
including qualitative data techniques to complement these results. A natural step 
forward from our quantitative research is to interview former hopefuls who were not 
able to secure office at one point in time but were considered by the insurance policy 
system for good losers and were appointed by a president. Similarly, also-rans who 
eventually won office can detail their experiences and complement what the results of 
this project showed. 
An exploration of this type can help confirm these two dimensions as pivotal to 
parties in the development of new strategies for losing candidates. Or, conversely, it can 
help bring light to new factors, unexplored in this project, that are important 
determinants of the fate of also-rans. We can think of more informal links between 
candidates and parties that are also important in their future chances to compete for a 
legislative seat, like having worked for a party for a number of years, or networking 
with party officials.  
Likely, other quantifiable factors can be in the mix when explaining the 
strategies of re-nomination for candidates and parties. Another step forward involves 
the collection of more correlates like campaign finances, the careers of candidates 
before politics, and more socio-demographic indicators. Collection of these numbers for 
losing candidates is not well kept in Chile, particularly in the first handful of elections, 
but the literature has been consistent in finding a correlation between money and votes, 
as well as with the past of a candidate. 
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With that said, we hope this to be the start of a more systematic study of electoral 
losers across elections and over time. Not only because we get to see many politicians 
return to politics and become important policymakers across levels of government, but 
also because they complete the analytical picture presented by every elections process. 
Currently, we are lacking all the knowledge we could have to understand why losers 
come back, and to predict the chances of repeating for promising politicians who could 
eventually become important contributors to a democracy. 
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Appendix 
For chapter 3, we develop a few models as robustness checks. First, as an 
extension to the model presented in the chapter, we add interactions between electoral 
performance and electoral experience. In addition, we add a variable that captures losers 
of elections who obtained a higher vote share than eventual winners. This particularity 
is possible given the electoral system that counts votes by parties/coalitions instead of 
by individual candidates. Finally, we leave the coalition and year effects – used but not 
shown in the chapter models – in these models. 
This model shows that, compared to retired candidates, the first loser differential 
is a significant correlate for candidates who end up being re-nominated. This is similar 
in the case of also-rans who switch districts within the same chamber. Similarly, 
electoral experience is a significant variable for all four outcomes, with a local winner 
increasing their chances to move back to local elections after losing in the legislature, 
but also becoming important for losing candidates that end up re-nominated. In turn, 
and compared to retired also-rans, being a veteran affects positively the chances for 
candidates to seek a higher election seat and to change districts. 
Table A.1: Full logistic regression models with determinants of four outcomes for 
losing candidates, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2013 
Variables Re-nomination Higher election Within-chamber 
district change 
Retired 
     
First loser  0.0655*** -0.0525 0.0267 -0.0381*** 
differential (FLD) (0.0158) (0.0343) (0.0180) (0.00948) 
Local Winner 0.734* 0.399 0.0355 -0.973*** 
 (0.383) (1.443) (0.512) (0.321) 
Veteran -0.194 1.779*** 0.406 -0.0237 
 (0.312) (0.649) (0.311) (0.195) 
Local winner * FLD 0.0533 0.00185 0.0534 0.0115 
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 (0.0384) (0.0953) (0.0499) (0.0273) 
Veteran * FLD 0.0171 0.0435 -0.0320 0.0144 
 (0.0228) (0.0395) (0.0209) (0.0128) 
Capital city dummy -1.108*** 0.776 1.145*** 0.203 
 (0.306) (0.539) (0.260) (0.175) 
Capital * FLD -0.0533** 0.0161 0.0325* 0.0141 
 (0.0217) (0.0339) (0.0191) (0.0120) 
Top place but lost 0.450 0.178 -0.249 -0.435 
 (0.335) (0.830) (0.453) (0.265) 
Woman 0.235 0.388 -0.522** 0.186 
 (0.198) (0.338) (0.251) (0.122) 
Incumbent 0.558 -0.560 -0.374 -0.216 
 (0.377) (0.731) (0.421) (0.246) 
Senate -1.334*** -0.679 -0.108 0.173 
 (0.403) (0.542) (0.277) (0.147) 
Hiatus 0.482 -0.348 0.0256 0.0350 
 (0.400) (0.583) (0.332) (0.221) 
Concertación -0.898** -1.035 0.561 0.679** 
 (0.435) (0.756) (0.759) (0.285) 
Alianza -0.614 -1.498** 0.437 0.481* 
 (0.417) (0.753) (0.753) (0.276) 
Satellite coalitions -0.189 -0.694 0.745 -0.486* 
 (0.396) (0.639) (0.738) (0.263) 
1997 0.0125 -0.814* 0.113 0.278* 
 (0.278) (0.458) (0.267) (0.162) 
2001 -0.181 -0.408 -0.304 0.129 
 (0.304) (0.444) (0.297) (0.173) 
2005 -0.720** -0.832* -0.215 0.471*** 
 (0.335) (0.500) (0.291) (0.170) 
2009 -0.0334 -0.783 -0.348 0.333** 
 (0.282) (0.479) (0.296) (0.166) 
2013 0.471* -1.420*** -1.153*** 0.667*** 
 (0.254) (0.542) (0.343) (0.160) 
Constant -1.018** -3.412*** -2.866*** -0.747** 
 (0.468) (0.873) (0.788) (0.310) 
     
Observations 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 
Pseudo R2 0.0800 0.0714 0.0691 0.0430 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
These full models present interactions between candidate performance and 
experience, but they do not hold statistical significance across the four outcomes. 
Additionally, the variable that marks losers who obtained more votes than an eventual 
winner is also lacking significance, despite having the expected signs. With that said, 
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the variables of interest still correlate significantly, with the first loser differential being 
a deterrent of retirement, while fostering re-nomination efforts. The combination of 
performance and a capital city district is also significant for the chances of a district 
change within the same chamber, while performance is a strong correlate for higher-
election seeking. 
Moving on, we include another outcome for also-rans into our models and run a 
multinomial logistical regression with the category of retirement from electoral politics 
as the baseline. Thus, we compare the determinants of retirement to the four other 
outcomes: moving to a local election after defeat without coming back to the legislature, 
to changing districts within the same chamber, to seeking a higher election seat, and to 
being re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. 
The table below shows that compared to also-rans who retire, losing candidates 
who over-perform electorally have a greater chance of re-nomination to the same seat 
in the next election. Similarly, electoral experience plays a significant role, because 
previous local winners have a greater likelihood of re-nomination, despite electoral 
defeat. Experience is also significant for higher election seat seekers, and for candidates 
who change districts, both compared to retiring losers. 
Likewise, and compared to losing candidates who retire, local winners have a 
higher likelihood of going back to local elections after their adventures in the legislature. 
Then, candidates in the capital have a greater chance of switching districts within the 
chamber, and a lower probability of re-nomination for the same seat in the next election. 
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Table A.2: Multinominal logistic regression for determinants of four outcomes 
for losing candidates, baseline outcome is retirement from electoral politics 
Variables To local 
election 
Within-chamber 
district change 
Higher election Re-nomination 
     
First loser  0.0121 0.0305* -0.0127 0.0919*** 
differential (FLD) (0.0106) (0.0161) (0.0285) (0.0143) 
Local Winner 1.405*** 0.475 1.039 0.971*** 
 (0.247) (0.474) (0.781) (0.336) 
Veteran -0.0435 0.760*** 1.256*** -0.258 
 (0.171) (0.219) (0.351) (0.262) 
Capital city 
dummy 
-0.175 0.946*** 0.684 -1.154*** 
 (0.239) (0.273) (0.555) (0.322) 
Capital * FLD -0.00591 0.0212 0.0103 -0.0592*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0199) (0.0353) (0.0230) 
Woman -0.241 -0.581** 0.279 0.127 
 (0.151) (0.258) (0.345) (0.205) 
Incumbent 0.193 -0.512 -0.210 0.715* 
 (0.334) (0.413) (0.710) (0.371) 
Senate -0.796*** -0.138 -0.750 -1.350*** 
 (0.217) (0.284) (0.550) (0.409) 
Hiatus -0.148 -0.00389 -0.387 0.406 
 (0.297) (0.350) (0.597) (0.413) 
Concertación -0.680* 0.164 -1.368* -1.199*** 
 (0.385) (0.774) (0.767) (0.456) 
Alianza -0.223 0.149 -1.785** -0.807* 
 (0.366) (0.767) (0.771) (0.438) 
Satellite coalitions 0.857** 0.918 -0.497 0.0968 
 (0.348) (0.750) (0.657) (0.418) 
1997 -0.194 -0.0152 -0.945** -0.127 
 (0.208) (0.280) (0.467) (0.292) 
2001 0.188 -0.276 -0.552 -0.245 
 (0.218) (0.309) (0.456) (0.317) 
2005 -0.0208 -0.378 -1.082** -0.926*** 
 (0.212) (0.302) (0.509) (0.347) 
2009 -0.0193 -0.458 -0.983** -0.205 
 (0.209) (0.308) (0.489) (0.296) 
2013 -0.371* -1.413*** -1.781*** 0.0626 
 (0.202) (0.353) (0.550) (0.267) 
Constant -0.701* -2.012** -1.958** 0.0251 
 (0.403) (0.799) (0.817) (0.488) 
     
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 
Pseudo R2 0.0741 0.0741 0.0741 0.0741 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally, we develop a third set of models including fixed effects. Given that this 
technique explores within-subject variation, retirement is not a proper outcome for a 
model like this. However, regressions done with the xtreg command in STATA allow 
for cases to remain in the model. Below is the set of models including year and coalition 
effects, as well as fixed effects. Time-invariant variables like the sex of the candidate 
are dropped automatically by the software. 
Table A.3: Fixed-effects linear model for the determinants of four outcomes for 
losing candidates 
Variables Re-nomination Higher 
election 
Within-chamber 
district change 
Retired 
     
First loser  0.00925** -0.00361* -0.00105 -0.00415 
differential (FLD) (0.00373) (0.00214) (0.00399) (0.00397) 
Local Winner 0.250 0.109 -0.318* 0.100 
 (0.162) (0.0929) (0.173) (0.172) 
Veteran -0.425*** 0.0289 -0.149*** 0.338*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0287) (0.0536) (0.0533) 
Capital city  -0.141 0.0770 -0.0698 0.0278 
dummy (0.0916) (0.0524) (0.0978) (0.0973) 
Capital * FLD -0.00515 0.00131 -0.00245 0.0122* 
 (0.00604) (0.00346) (0.00646) (0.00642) 
Incumbent 0.307*** 0.0495 0.00210 -0.227** 
 (0.0934) (0.0535) (0.0998) (0.0993) 
Senate -0.0578 -0.455*** -0.117* -0.0220 
 (0.0617) (0.0353) (0.0659) (0.0655) 
Hiatus 0.426*** 0.0343 0.124* -0.171** 
 (0.0657) (0.0376) (0.0702) (0.0697) 
Top place but lost 0.269*** -0.0421 -0.101 -0.230** 
 (0.0977) (0.0559) (0.104) (0.104) 
Concertación -0.0806 -0.0256 0.220 -0.0858 
 (0.196) (0.112) (0.209) (0.208) 
Alianza 0.0635 0.0958 0.0382 -0.227 
 (0.140) (0.0801) (0.150) (0.149) 
Satellite coalitions -0.0596 0.0295 0.160 -0.0760 
 (0.132) (0.0754) (0.141) (0.140) 
1997 0.0100 -0.0780** 0.00252 0.147** 
 (0.0603) (0.0345) (0.0644) (0.0640) 
2001 -0.0141 -0.0978** -0.0876 0.148* 
 (0.0748) (0.0428) (0.0799) (0.0795) 
2005 -0.0409 -0.166*** -0.175* 0.318*** 
 146 
 (0.0865) (0.0495) (0.0925) (0.0919) 
2009 0.107 -0.151*** -0.329*** 0.494*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0550) (0.103) (0.102) 
2013 0.00860 -0.195*** -0.325*** 0.692*** 
 (0.112) (0.0642) (0.120) (0.119) 
Constant 0.304** 0.0892 0.172 0.194 
 (0.131) (0.0748) (0.140) (0.139) 
     
Observations 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 
R-squared 0.373 0.394 0.168 0.475 
Number of groups 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These models support the strength of electoral performance as a correlate for 
also-rans eventually landing a re-nomination for the same seat, but the significance of 
this variable is lacking in the retirement outcome. Likewise, the significance is also 
lacking for veteran candidates in the model for a higher election outcome, as well as the 
interaction between a capital city district and the first loser differential for the model 
featuring a within-chamber district change. 
 
 
 
